There are not a lot of rules in the British intelligence game: a handful of laws that Parliament has managed to cobble together; a guideline or two, usually inherited from another age. And so, for an outsider, it is breathtaking to discover the frequency and ease with which the few existing rules are evaded, manipulated and quite simply broken.
For example, the supposedly private communications of British businessmen and corporations are being ambushed routinely by GCHQ. Victims include Rolls Royce, Marconi, British oil and mining companies – “anything seen to be an integral part of the British economy”.
The practice is particularly striking when it is matched against the 1985 Interception of Communications Act. For the first time, the law allowed British intelligence to tap phones not just to catch subversives and terrorists but also “to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”. However, Parliament explicitly restricted this right to “the acts or intentions of persons outside the British Islands”. This restriction did not suit British intelligence, so they simply ignored it.
This is only one among a cluster of illegalities reflecting a cavalier attitude to the law. It is part of a powerful pattern of behaviour which has seen Britain’s secret agencies develop techniques and targets which go far beyond the frail limits of the rule book.
The pattern begins with an unstoppable quest for intelligence regardless of its real importance to national security, fed by advances in technology. A central example is the transfer of international communications from the relatively impenetrable cable and old-fashioned radio links to satellites, which are wonderfully vulnerable to GCHQ. Another is the design of computers which are capable of panhandling a limitless mass of telex traffic in search of specified combinations of key words and names: GCHQ, we learned, now has a network of these computers, collectively known as The Dictionary.
Once tempted, the intelligence community invariably indulges itself, because the one restraint which might inhibit them – any form of public or parliamentary scrutiny – is absent. The banning of trade unions from GCHQ is seen by some intelligence workers as a necessary part of this total isolation. Secrecy corrupts, and absolute secrecy means you can kiss the law goodbye.
GCHQ’s listening post at Bude, North Cornwall, has stretched the law so far that some workers started rebelling. Bude’s work has been revolutionised by the advent of telecom satellites and greatly expanded as a result of a re-organisation in 1986. The station now spends 24 hours a day combing through private, civilian communications on some of the world’s busiest satellites – those over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
Its routine involves three kinds of work. First, it conducts ‘standard baseband surveys’, repeatedly trawling through each nation’s satellite basebands to discover who is using which channels and what their targets are saying. Second, it has developed a ‘wildcard’ system which enables it to intercept all calls with a particular dialling code. Thirdly, it monitors individual numbers.
Staff were unsure whether any of their baseband surveys were legal. They were particularly worried about the lawfulness of trawling through the United Kingdom channels, and backed off them in 1985 until their managers assured them it was legal. The managers’ reasoning is not known.
Through Bude, which was modernised with the help of US money, GCHQ can pick up communications coming into Britain, while America’s National Security Agency – GCHQ’s partner – can pick up communications coming into the US. GCHQ and NSA can then exchange the information to complete the record of two-way conversations. This enables the agencies to get around the “one-terminal” rule which dictates that GCHQ should never eavesdrop on a communication which has a British citizen at both ends.
The pattern of law-bending is clear, too, in the operation which British intelligence has been running at a dreary four-storey building in Palmer Street, Westminster, sometimes referred to as GCHQ’s London office.
After the war, Palmer Street concentrated on a handful of special targets and the London embassies. Though this was technically a breach of the 1964 Diplomatic Privileges Act and other international agreements on telecommunications, it was small stuff compared to what happened after computers were introduced in the 1970s.
Palmer Street started using an umbilical cable linking it to BT’s international telex network to intercept telexes passing into, out of, or through, London. This covers thousands of supposedly private messages every day: diplomatic cables to and from embassies; a deluge of commercial telex traffic; and a rich harvest of Third World traffic routed through London on its way from one country to another. The entire operation is illegal.
GCHQ is entitled to intercept a telex only if it has a warrant signed by a Secretary of State. But GCHQ created a loophole. Palmer Street is a GCHQ building. The computer belongs to GCHQ. It runs on GCHQ software and according to GCHQ’s daily instructions. But after a close study of the law, GCHQ arranged for the equipment to be handled by BT workers. Thus it can pretend that the traffic has never left BT’s hands – therefore, it cannot have been intercepted and so GCHQ cannot have broken the law. That is the intelligence game.
Nick Davies is the reporter on World in Action’s programme, Defending The Realm, broadcast last night.