Zimbabwe is divided now, as it has been for years, over one bitter issue – land. The same struggle between black peasants and wealthy white farmers which dragged the country into civil war under Ian Smith has flared again.
The armed insurrection of dissidents in Matabeleland, the Government’s bloody campaign of repression, the power play of the South Africans are all re-lated to the old dispute.
When Mr Robert Mugabe came to power in April 1980, he had a clear choice: he could either act on the slogans of the bush war and seize the assets of the rich whites; or he could back down and set out on a long, slow road to socialism.
Seizing white assets meant provoking an exodus of white capital, technology and skills; an end to most Western trade and aid; and, almost certainly, the kind of – covert military interference from South Africa which has bedevilled Angola and Mozambique.
That prospect was too daunting, and Mr Mugabe backed down. He is now caught between the insurrection and dissent of militants pursuing the old war slogans; and the enveloping power of the white interest groups with whom he has decided to work. His socialism has crumbled into a succession of compromises, each generating more political friction.
The militants see 700,000 African families still cramped into the old Tribal Trust Lands, scraping a meagre living from the poorest soil in the country. Only the names have been changed so that the areas are now called Communal Lands. They compare that with the wealth of the 4,600 commercial white farmers who own 38 per cent of the country and, between them, produce 90 per cent of the country s agricultural goods and earn 47 per cent of its foreign currency.
That small group of farmers is the biggest employer in the country – 255,000 people work for them, mostly Africans. The equivocal achievement of Mr Mugabe’s Government has been to raise their wages by 66 per cent — from $30 a month to $50.
The militants, most of whom come from peasant families and fought as guerrillas during the war, want much more. The white farmers must give up their 14.2 million hectares and share it between the families in the communal lands and the workers on the white farms, they say.
The white farmers have erected a series of barriers to protect themselves and pulled Mr Mugabe in behind them. All the Government has been able to offer is two million hectares of land – which was abandoned or unwanted by the whites – and rhetoric.
The first barrier is the Lancaster House agreement. Section 16 – three pages long, and outrunning all others – forbids the seizure of land. It must be transferred on a “willing seller, willing buyer” basis. That legal barrier is reinforced by the British Foreign Office, which is committed to paying half the cost of land resettlement – a high bill. If the land is seized, the British funds will be withheld, a threat which has proved to be a powerful deterrent.
A further shifting series of barriers has been erected by the Commercial Farmers’ Union, who are gaining the maximum leverage from their traditional argument that only they – the old white rural elite – have the necessary skills, technology, and capital to make the land fully productive.
The union has been helped in its manoeuvring by the two-year drought which has drastically cut the yield of crops and meat, making it even more difficult for the government to trust the productivity of its inexperienced and under-capitalised black farmers.
Trapped between the intransigent white farmers and the impatient rural blacks, Mr Mugabe resorted to rhetoric. Having agreed in the winter of 1981 that 54,000 families should be resettled in the coming three years, he announced in January 1982 that the target had been trebled to 162,000.
It didn’t help. He raised the expectations of the landless blacks and worried the whites. So far, after three years, only 20,500 families have been resettled, at an estimated cost of $50 million for the land and a further $55 million for administration and infrastructure.
Impatience has led to a degree of political alienation which has, in turn, spawned dissident violence, setting off a spiral of government repressions and armed backlash. The spiral is still continuing.
The same conflict between the old white interests and the black majority is mirrored in commerce and industry, where 70 per cent of the assets are owned by multinational companies.
One South African-based company, Anglo-American, owns the entire sugar industry apart from two small refineries; dominates mining; and has interests in four commercial banks, six finance houses, three building societies and numerous other industries.
These companies have succeeded in promoting a succession of their own policies by a combination of personal contact, threats of catastrophe and leverage from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The Chamber of Commerce in Harare has been working its way through the Cabinet, wining and dining ministers one by one. When one senior government official got married, his reception and honeymoon were paid for by an international company.
A great deal of their straightforward lobbying is aimed at the Finance Minister, Mr Bernard Chidzero, who had a meteoric career at the United Nations before going to Harare to amalgamate the departments of economic planning and finance, becoming one of the most powerful men in the cabinet.
He is the conduit through which the white farmers and the big companies have been able to flood the nascent socialist African state with capitalist Western policies. Mr Chidzero explains in his National Development Plan that foreign companies are crucial to his approach: “Government recognises the need to stimulate private sector investment by creating a favourable investment climate and taking necessary fiscal, monetary, and other financial measures.”
The IMF has been involved in the economy for the past 18 months months. Under its auspices, Mr Chidzero has devalued the Zimbabwe dollar by an effective 23 per cent, helping the export of sugar, tobacco and minerals, but grossly inflating the price of imported oil. Extra transport costs have to be passed on to the consumer.
Anglo American, with its web of interests in the economy, has been particularly successful in lobbying the government. It has persuaded the World Bank and the cabinet to finance a new power station at its Hwange colliery.
Government critics say that the new station is not needed. But Anglo American now has a market for the low-grade coal which it mines at Hwange and which is almost unsaleable in the rest of the country as transport costs raise its price to an unrealistic level.
The dispute between white economic power and black political ambitions echoes through every avenue of the economy. Mr Mugabe froze rents, so landlords stopped letting. He raised wages, so employers raised their prices. He protected workers against being dismissed, so employers closed whole factories.
It is possible that, in the long term, the present struggle between Zapu and Zanu will develop into a more traditional clash between left and right with the international community coming in to take sides. Mr Mugabe’s increasingly harsh treatment of internal dissent is a measure of the danger he sees.