Badakhshan, northern Afghanistan. July 1983. An Englishman travelling with a group of Mujahadeen guerrillas dies in an ambush by Russian troops. The Russians recover his body along with a miniature satellite dish, a transmitter and a computerised keyboard. The Russians say the dead man was one of six Englishmen working with the Mujahadeen and they identify him by his passport as Stuart Bodman. The real Stuart Bodman, a warehouseman from Surrey, is alive and well and playing darts in his local. He has no idea how his name has come to be used in the Afghan mountains. There are reports that the six Englishmen are former SAS men who are working on a secret contract to set up eavesdropping posts for the Americans. It is suggested that they were hired through a London security company, KMS Ltd. The Foreign Office says it will investigate. Nothing more is heard.
Kampala, Uganda. February, 1986. A helicopter gunship attempts to launch a rocket attack on the new President, Yoweri Museveni, as he is installed as head of state after a long civil war. Two white men are captured and questioned. They are linked to a group of former SAS men who had been hired by the deposed president to teach his men how to fly military helicopters. The former SAS men, who work for a London security company, Defence Systems Ltd, say they had no part in the assassination attempt. The Foreign Office denies reports that their role in Uganda was secretly approved by the British Government.
Dublin. December, 1983. Supermarket executive Don Tidey is released in a shoot-out after being kidnapped and held for 23 days by the Provisional IRA. The IRA then threaten his employers, Associated British Foods, that more of their executives will be kidnapped unless the company pays them £12 million in protection money. A group of former SAS men, who advised the company during the kidnapping of Tidey, spend the next three months trying to persuade them not to make the payment. But the money is handed over. The men, who work for a London security company, Control Risks, are publicly criticised for not telling the authorities what was going on. A Labour MP calls for them to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act which bans the passing of funds to terrorists.
Strange, apparently isolated incidents like these have been cropping up for more than a decade, and it has always been extremely difficult to get to the truth of them or to see the linkage between them. It is only when things have gone wrong that any information at all has surfaced, but now the cat may be out of the bag.
The trouble has started in Washington, with the now familiar figure of Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North. The very public collapse of his hitherto secret operation has brought the masonry crashing down around a hidden world which includes Britain as well as the United States. North bypassed the American Congress by using private companies to pump arms and money around the world. The companies were staffed by former members of the Washington defence establishment who enjoyed the dual blessing of profit and patriotism while secretly doing the White House’s dirty work. Much of the work was carried out in London, and some of the people they used were British. The exposure of Oliver North in Washington has suddenly cast light on the ubiquitous former SAS men and their security companies.
The picture that emerges is both alarming and fascinating. It is now apparent that there is a large pool of former British soldiers, mostly from the SAS, who hire themselves out to powerful security companies, which are usually run by former army and intelligence officers. They are available for a whole range of work from VIP body-guarding through kidnap negotiation and counter-terrorism to mercenary activity in paramilitary campaigns, coups and assassinations. Different companies specialize in different areas.
This is much more than just a Boy’s Own adventure. It is a set-up which is becoming increasingly attractive to governments, and just as Oliver North with his can-do, go-getter image proved irresistible to Ronald Reagan, so his counterparts in Britain have become indispensable in London’s corridors of power. The network of companies represents a privatisation of the intelligence community.
Initially, the companies were developed to soak up the unemployed skills of men leaving the SAS but now they have moved on and taken over some of the most important roles of the police, the Security Service and M16. The attraction to governments is partly financial – payment by results – but, much more important, it is political. The development allows the most respectable of governments to bypass the machinery of democratic scrutiny (weak as that may be). It is a development that was very likely to appeal to Mrs Thatcher who has been embarrassed by MI5 in the exposure of Anthony Blunt, the arrest of Michael Bettaney and the excruciating saga of Peter Wright’s book. She has frequently fallen out with MI5 and is known to include M16 in her oft-stated mistrust of the Foreign Office. Big private companies also can hire these agents. And all of it is blissfully, beautifully deniable—or at least it was until Oliver North got caught out.
Tracing back, it is possible to pin-point the birth of this network to July 1973 when a group of insurance brokers in the City sat down to solve a new problem. Irish and Palestinian terrorism was beginning to sweep through Europe; businessmen and politicians were particularly nervous of being kidnapped and were trying to insure themselves against the result; but the brokers were worried that they did not know enough to set the right premiums and, just as important, they wanted to make sure that they would not be the victims of fraudulent claims. So they set up a new company to hire kidnap specialists who could guide them.
The company was called Control Risks and it found its specialists in the SAS. They soon realized that it was not good enough to fix a premium and then retire to the sidelines until a client was kidnapped and a huge ransom paid; they needed to be more involved to try and keep ransom payments down. That took them into a morally difficult area where they were negotiating the payment of ransom and, therefore, likely to be accused of encouraging kidnappers.
They had a nasty experience in Bogota in 1977 when an American businessman was kidnapped. Two of their people, both former SAS, spent eight months on the job, secured the man’s release for a minimum ransom and then found themselves rewarded with a spell in prison when the Colombian police decided they were effectively giving the local criminals an incentive to carry on kidnapping. They were released after a few weeks, but the controversy has stayed with them.
Last year they were called in by the family of Jennifer Guinness, the banker’s wife who was kidnapped in Dublin. Her captors were demanding £2 million for her safe release. The Control Risks men tried to begin negotiations, but the Irish police saw them as trespassers and became aggressive. Mrs Guinness was soon released when police found the hide-out where she was being held, and Control Risks left Dublin with the Irish Justice Minister, Alan Dukes, swearing that he would outlaw the whole business of kidnap insurance.
But, despite the problems, they have become wealthy. They command an annual retainer of more than £2 million from Lloyds’ insurance and charge £1,000 per man per day for their advice. They have expanded their operation, now also providing an intelligence service for private companies, updating them on the state of terrorist threat in different parts of the world; and they carry out ‘crisis management studies’, for example, advising West End stores on how to react to a bomb threat. Their clients have included 21 of the world’s top 50 banks and 31 of the 50 biggest industrial corporations.
They have also enlisted the help of some of the most powerful and prestigious figures in the world of intelligence and security. The Control Risks roll-call includes former Metropolitan Commissioner Sir Robert Mark; former Governor of Rhodesia Lord Soames; former Commander in Chief of UK Land Forces Field Marshal Sir John Stonier; former chief of the British army in Northern Ireland General Sir Frank King; two former heads of military intelligence in Northern Ireland; and numerous former SAS officers. The big names have not been frightened off by the controversy surrounding the company, and it has been reported that the retiring Metropolitan Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Newman, is due to join them.
This wooing of security stars is a bizarre policy. Many of those close to Control Risks think it is simply a waste of money since people of this calibre tend to be very expensive but also past their prime. It appears to reflect the personality of the SAS officer who now runs the company, Major Arish Turle MC, former Greenjacket and SAS squadron leader, who left the army in 1976 without having satisfied his ambition to take command. “The company is the command he never had,” according to a colleague. “That’s why he hires these people.”
The most important name in the company’s history is not nearly so well known. Major David John Walker was the first managing director of Control Risks, a job he took on leaving the SAS in 1974. He was there for only three years, during which time he tried to take the company into the far more sensitive area of paramilitary work for foreign governments. To do this, he set up a subsidiary called KMS and when his fellow directors expressed doubts, he organized a buy-out and went out alone. Ten years later, KMS is the most powerful mercenary outfit in Europe.
Oliver North is only the most recent – and the most unfortunate – of its clients. Its most important has been the Sultan of Oman, who ousted his father in a coup which was organized with the help of an older generation of SAS men and who has rewarded the regiment by giving KMS a long-running multi-million-dollar contract to train and equip his special forces.
The company has also worked in Pakistan, where the government asked it to evaluate its special forces regiment. To do this, KMS is said to have taken it across the border into Afghanistan and set it up in a fight with Russian troops which unfortunately included a unit from the Russian equivalent of the SAS, the Spetsnaz. In Sri Lanka, KMS has set up and is still training the Special Task Force which is spearheading the government’s campaign against Tamil separatists. But some of the KMS men have walked out in protest after the Special Task Force started torturing and killing Tamil villagers.
In all this, according to men who have worked for KMS, the company is acting with the knowledge of people within the Whitehall establishment. They say that contracts receive tacit approval in Whitehall, and that some of its work may even be procured for the company by British intelligence. For example, the Sri Lankan government is said to have asked the Foreign Office for a detachment of regular SAS men; the Foreign Office refused on the grounds that this might upset the Indian government, which supports Tamil nationalists. However, the Sri Lankan government found the counter-terrorist expertise it needed in KMS. So neither India nor Sri Lanka was offended.
In the same way Saladin Security, an off-shoot of KMS, provides former SAS bodyguards, who earn a fortune for the company and a diplomatic advantage for the British government. Clients have included the Saudi ambassador in Washington, who pays £700,000 a year for 18 former SAS men; the former Saudi oil minister, Sheikh Yamani; the deposed Sudanese President Nimeiri; and the Aga Khan.
David Walker, who has just bought out his fellow shareholders in Saladin, is said by his colleagues to be on first-name terms with the Prime Minister. Taxed on this in the House of Commons, Mrs Thatcher has refused to reply. Walker’s friends speak of him going round to Downing Street for private chats with her. After repeated questions from opposition MPs, the Foreign Office has now admitted hiring KMS to provide bodyguards for its diplomats in trouble spots like Kampala and Beirut. But it still denies using the company for paramilitary operations.
Other SAS officers have tried to emulate KMS but with less success. J. Donne Holdings folded after it was exposed in the press for selling techniques of sabotage and ‘silent killing’ to clients, who included Colonel Ghadaffi. Some of its former personnel were then linked with an attempted coup in the Maldives. Special Project Consultants ran into trouble when a director, former SAS trooper Brian Crapper, was questioned by the Anti-Terrorist Branch about his links with Libyan hit squads in London.
Defence Systems Ltd has fared better. Run by a charismatic former SAS major, Alastair Morrison, who led the successful raid on hijackers at Mogadishu, DSL has picked up lucrative contracts in Angola, Mozambique, Uganda, Indonesia and the Philippines, swallowing up two smaller companies – Intersec and Falconstar – along the way. They have had some trouble: in Uganda, when their client was deposed; and in Angola, where a group of their men were kidnapped by UNITA rebels in 1984 while organising security for diamond mines in the north of the country. The men were force-marched nearly 1,000 miles through the bush, held for three months and finally released after intense diplomatic activity.
DSL has emerged in the last two years as the only challenger to KMS’s pre-eminence. There are many in the SAS world who would like KMS pushed off its perch, who are jealous of its superb contacts in Whitehall and who complain that it is always passed the juiciest contracts. The key to the future of all of the companies lies in Whitehall.
The experience of central America is most likely to yield the truth. For in its relentless pursuit of Oliver North, the American Congress has dragged out more and more information about the role of KMS in the secret US support for the right-wing Nicaraguan guerrilla group, the Contras. We now know that David Walker was called in by North as soon as Congress vetoed military aid for the Contras in October 1984 and that he was brought in on the advice of no less a figure than the then US Navy Secretary, John Lehman.
We also know that Walker suggested that KMS men could go into the Nicaraguan capital, Managua, and destroy government helicopters on the ground, and that North introduced him to the Contra leader, Adolfo Calero, together with a bank draft for $20 million and the suggestion that “you make use of some of it for my British friend’. The London Daily News has disclosed that KMS sent teams of men to central America to train Contras and that this was arranged through a Vietnam veteran, Lieutenant-Colonel William Mott IV, who was then deputy defence attache at the US embassy in London. The live issue – which will decide the future of KMS and many of the other companies – is the extent to which all this turn out to have been known and approved by the British government. It is that highly sensitive area which the Congressional inquiry in Washington has kept threatening to uncover.