Geoffrey Prime has caused panic in Whitehall and fury in Washington because, with very little skill and the greatest of ease, he has made a nonsense of the biggest, most ambitious and most expensive operation in the history of espionage.
At the Government Communications Headquarters in Cheltenham, where Prime used to work, intelligence officers use a massive battery of technological aids to spy on the military, commercial and political life of among others the Russians, Chinese, the Northern Irish and even the Americans.
The Cheltenham officers had details of the Russian plan to invade Afghanistan three weeks before the invasion took place and passed on the information to governments who then claimed to be surprised when the Russians moved. They detected the first tremors of the Cuban missile crisis a clear 12 months before it erupted as an international incident. The base constantly monitors and updates the deployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces on land, air and sea.
Prime worked his way into the heart of this vast exercise in global eavesdropping, threatening the whole logic of the operation. But the implications of his penetration go even further, since the Cheltenham base has two other, equally important functions.
It is in many respects the brain of the British contingency plan for dealing with a nuclear attack. Officers there need to know the day-by-day location of all NATO forces, with whom they may need to communicate, as well as the details of early warnings and states of alerts — all critically sensitive information.
It is also an important communications channel through which M16 can contact its informants and officers in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union by transmitting on pre-arranged wavelengths – information which could lead to the identification of those contacts.
These three functions give GCHQ a unique importance. The fact that the base is jointly run and funded with the Americans, the Canadians and the Australians lends a further dimension to its significance. The Western intelligence network relies so heavily on Britain — and in particular on GCHQ in Cheltenham – that, as one knowledgeable source in Washington put it: “Anyone in the right position at GCHQ can cause massive damage to the whole of US intelligence collection.”
This international network of co-operation in spying, which was formally enshrined in the confidential UK-USA agreement of 1947, is based on a history of jealousy and bungling which has been uncovered by the Cambridge historian Christopher Andrew.
During the first World War, the Admiralty’s Room 40 and the War Office’s M11b squabbled for power over cryptography. The Admiralty won and then did too well for its own good in 1922 by intercepting a telegram which revealed that the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, was secretly dealing with the French behind the backs of the Cabinet. This embarrassment inspired the Foreign Office to take over cryptography itself.
Their Government Code and Cypher School in Bletchley decoded a stream of Russian messages until 1927 when the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, arrogantly published four intercepted telegrams, so tipping off Moscow about Bletchley’s success. Moscow changed its coding system, and security sources claim that its high-grade communications have not been cracked since.
During the First World War, the Americans relied for their code-breaking on a private team of analysts who had been recruited by an eccentric businessman to scour Tudor literature in search of a cypher which would show that Francis Bacon had written the works of Shakespeare.
Between the wars, jealousy between army and navy code-breakers was so bad that they arranged an absurd compromise under which the army analysed traffic received on days with an even date and the navy looked after days with an odd date. The Second World War and the 1947 co-operation agreement to put an end to the worst of the rivalry and incompetence.
The four signatories to the agreement – Britain, the United States, Canada and Australia – carved up the world into zones for the collection of material. Britain’s GCHQ looks after most of Europe, the Soviet Union east of the Urals, the whole of Africa and China. Canada’s Communications Security Establishment takes some of Europe and the north of the Soviet Union. Australia’s Joint Intelligence Organisation deals with South-east Asia, the South Pacific and parts of the Indian Ocean. The United States National Security Agency deals with everything else.
Internal GCHQ documents, used to train recruits, put the American NSA alone at the top of hierarchy.The NSA runs a vast organisation from its base at Fort Meade, Maryland, but it needs allied co-operation. A quirk in the way that radio waves travel from some European transmitters, for example, means they can be received in eastern Canada, but not in Britain.
The NSA’s job as defined by the National Security Council’s Intelligence Directive No. 6 is “the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic means and the processing of foreign encrypted communications however transmitted”. In operational terms, that instruction means that the Americans in consort with their three partners have set up a global surveillance composed of layers of interception.
The most powerful and sophisticated layer – and one where Prime may have done the most damage – is the use of communication satellites, particularly the series of four ‘Rhyolite’ satellites. These satellites – fully publicised and discussed in the USA – intercept microwave communications, usually long-distance telephone calls and radio links and also telemetry signals, ie the streams of high frequency digital information by which a missile reports back to its earth station every aspect of its performance.
The first Rhyolite satellite was launched on March 6 1973 into a geosynchronous orbit 22,800 miles over the horn of Africa, from where it can watch the intercontinental ballistic missiles being tested at Tyuratam in Khazakhstan; and the SS16s and SS20s at the Plesetsk missile base. A second Rhyolite was launched on May 23 1977, at the same height, over Borneo to intercept Chinese and Soviet military communication and radar; and to monitor Soviet missiles being test fired into the Kamehatka mountains in eastern Russia.
Since then, two other Rhyolites have been launched into the same locations as back-up – an expensive hint of the importance of the Rhyolite satellites. US intelligence sources say openly that there is anxiety that Prime may have been able to disclose details of the programme.
The first satellite is thought to be tracked from one station in Britain from where raw material could be sent for processing to other branches of GCHQ where Prime worked during his career. United States analysts are reported to be particularly alarmed that the Russians have changed their telemetry system so that the information is now taped on the missile and ejected back to Earth, instead of being transmitted back to base on a high frequency of the type which Rhyolite intercepts.
Although Rhyolite is seen by the intelligence community as “the ultimate bug,” it is by no means the only satellite used for interception. The Big Birds, which orbit at between 90 and 100 miles, can photograph a car number plate and locate underground installations with their infra-red detectors. Ferret satellites map Soviet radar systems; 949s have an infra-red sensor to detect rocket plumes and Vela detectors to locate surface nuclear explosions; 647s over the Indian Ocean and the Panama Canal form an early warning net against submarine-launched missiles.
This array of satellites – purpose-built for thousands of millions of pounds – shoots information back to tracking stations which are run by any of the four partners to the 1947 agreement. It is processed and much of it is pooled with intercepts from other sources.
The second layer of intercepts is a network of long-range listening stations, devoted mainly to tracking the movement of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. It is a very thorough operation. “They track everything that moves – from a cup of tea to an atom bomb,” said one man who has worked in several of the stations.
The stations use radio searches, VHF intercepts, a specialised radar tracking system called SWAMP, and ultra short wave intercepts to provide a daily up-date of the world ‘order of battle’, the exact disposition and detail of all military forces.
Professor John Erikson, who lectures in Soviet military strategy and communications at Edinburgh University, and who has also trained GCHQ staff, said: “They know a lot about Soviet and Warsaw Pact order of battle. They have a very complete picture from all sorts of information which they pick up.”
Outside Britain, GCHQ runs long-range listening posts at Sinop in Turkey, Tai Mo Shan and Little Sai Wan in Hong Kong, Darwin in Australia, and in Mauritius, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Ascension Island, and Botswana. Inside Britain, a dozen stations collect and process information.
One radio operative who worked at a listening post described his work to the Guardian: “That place is highly sensitive. It’s an RAF place but there’s no runway, no planes. It’s pure sigint — signals intelligence. It’s amazing what they pick up there.
“There are about 250 RAF staff and some civilians as well – linguists in Russian, Polish, Hungarian, morse specialists, telegraphy specialists. They watch all military and civilian aircraft, tracking them and intercepting voice communication. The Russian pilots know you’re listening. Sometimes they give you a bit of backchat, say something cheeky. You pick up all kinds of personal stuff about who’s going to the party at the tavern tonight.
“Other times it’s very tense. You get a fighter plane, maybe, leaving a particular airfield in Russia at two in the morning and heading for Poland, and your agent on the ground has already warned you that it’s fully laden. A red light comes on on your radio set, and everyone in the room stands round watching this fighter. Everything else stops. You get that away to Cheltenham as fast as possible. There’s also a red phone there which goes through direct to Downing Street for something really big.”
At another base, a staff of British and American civilians produce special transcripts of the conversations of Russian pilots to try to identify regional accents – a clue to the origin of their unit. They also keep a master list of all names mentioned as well as noting jokes and references to other units and aircraft. It all helps to build up a picture of Soviet military capability.
Information from the satellites and the long-range listening stations is supplemented by a third layer of intercepts from short-range stations, grouped along frontiers with the Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet Union and China. Most of the work at this level is radio eavesdropping. The linguists are given special training in Russian obscenities to allow them to follow every detail of the radio traffic. So advanced is their linguistic ability that they compile their own dictionaries.
A former employee of one listening post described the routine inside the two hangars on the edge of the airfield where the eavesdropping is conducted: “It’s a very sophisticated operation. The equipment there must have cost a fortune. There are about 100 staff: they’re RAF people, but the whole thing is run by GCHQ. There were people tracking the movements of planes, logging grid references, checking morse; and other people taking voice communications. We followed our own traffic as well as theirs. We even intercepted Reuters.
“I was in Berlin when the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia. We were on stand-by for a month beforehand, working double shifts. We knew it was going to happen. Then all the Western governments turn round afterwards and say they’re surprised, and plead ignorance. That’s rubbish, complete rubbish.”
Professor Erikson confirmed the extent of eavesdropping during the Czech invasion: “They knew the Russian order of battle exactly. They also picked up the traffic from Soviet officers complaining about their conditions, which is an important factor.”
The fourth and final layer of interception covers the internal commercial, social and political traffic of target countries. “This is a very important area,” said Professor Erikson, “They monitor the internal traffic of the Soviet Union, using some very sophisticated equipment. It’s largely an American operation.”
The object is to monitor ‘indicators’ of the state of the country in search of clues to policy, particularly in the military field. Professor Erikson said: “The indicator business is very important. At one time there may be up to 200 indicators to tell you whether a state has warlike intentions. By no means all these indicators are military. They cover all aspects of the social, political, economic and the military competence state.”
It was these sort of internal indicators which alerted the GCHQ network to the Cuban missile crisis a year before it broke publicly in October, 1962. “One of the first indicators of that was in the autumn of 1961,” said Professor Erikson. “There was a shortage of bunkering fuel for ships in the north of the Soviet Union. Then, around March 1962, there was a lot of commercial traffic showing strange shipping movements in the south near Odessa, plus a lot of unusual radio traffic between Russia and Cuba.
“You can see that something is developing and then one small indicator will bring the whole picture together and close it off. That’s why the internal indicators are so important.”
A lot of the information is pooled between the four partners, although it is known that the American NSA has a special classification for some papers which are marked “No Foreign” to stop them being shared with the partners.
From Cheltenham, GCHQ sends processed information to Whitehall for the daily meetings of the Current Intelligence Groups which meet every morning to review up-to-date intelligence assessments, medium-term prognoses, and reports on sudden changes in indicator patterns. There is a similar daily meeting in Washington. On a weekly basis, the director of GCHQ, Sir Brian Tovey, travels to London by train to attend the Joint Intelligence Committee meeting.
It is common ground among those who have worked with GCHQ that it is handling so much raw information that it is often unable to process and assess it accurately while it is still useful. This delay, together with the ever-present possibility that an infiltrator such as Prime may be allowing the Russians to produce disinformation, may explain the recurrent charge that Western governments fail to act on the material which has been gathered for them.
Professor Erikson said: “There is a gigantic volume of information – far more than people can visualise. A great deal of it is dross and disinformation. Take the Falklands. It is perfectly apparent that we were reading the Argentine cables. Apparently, in this case, we just didn’t believe it.
“The real issue for the government is not how the information gets to them but whether it is believed. With Afghanistan, there was a gigantic amount of information available before the invasion. On December 7, 1979 – three weeks before the invasion – there were satellite photographs of Russian trucks on the road, radio reports.”
Although the four governments resolutely refuse to admit it, it is clear now that their eavesdropping is not aimed solely at declared enemies. They eavesdrop on allies, on domestic citizens and even on each other.
Officials in Washington publicly admitted last month that the Pentagon had been secretly assessing the intelligence capacity of Canada and other Western allies, but they denied allegations in Canadian newspapers that this amounted to spying. According to Reuters, who claim to have obtained a secret Congressional report, the American NSA has been routinely spying on confidential communications between British diplomats in Washington and London.
Earlier this year there were reports in Canada that the NSA had intercepted and decoded a message from the Ottawa government to its embassy in Washington. The reports were neither confirmed nor denied. In the late 1970s, the CIA was caught intervening directly in a union dispute in Australia which was holding up the supply of equipment to an NSA base in Alice Springs.
This mutual suspicion has not prevented the four partners co-operating in efforts to turn their surveillance network inwards on their own citizens. In an effort to evade the legal restriction on eavesdropping on American citizens, the NSA simply recruited GCHQ to do the job for them.
In his book, Puzzle Palace, recently published in the United States, James Bamford published internal NSA documents which record how GCHQ intercepted telegrams for the Americans as part of Operation Minaret, a programme of surveillance of radicals, including Jane Fonda and black leaders.
For the British, domestic surveillance has a special relevance because of Northern Ireland. Professor Erikson said: “We intercept our allies, everybody’s traffic. But I imagine that a lot of GCHQ is now concentrated on Northern Ireland.”
The sheer size and extraordinary political significance of the eavesdropping network have not stopped the four partner governments from taking every possible step to prevent their citizens discovering what they are doing, with the result that basic details of the operation are shrouded in vagueness. Estimates of the staff involved in GCHQ at Cheltenham range from 6,000 to 20,000. Estimates of the cost start at “hundreds of millions of pounds a year” and go as high as £500 millions.
“Modern military operations are not to do with weapons,” said Professor Erikson. “They are to do with information, command, control. Information does things. It fires weapons. It tells them where to go. The signals network is the key thing. If you want to disarm the world, don’t get rid of Trident, get rid of all the computers.
“It’s not about the muscle, the strong arm of the warrior. It is his nervous system that matters. Signals and communications. If you can paralyse them or render them inert or compromise them, you can do a terrific amount of damage.”