The police operation that led to the conviction of the men who raped and murdered nine-year-old Daniel Handley was a masterpiece of detection, but the success of its outcome masks a story of embarrassing failure in Scotland Yard.
In an exclusive interview, the man who led the operation, Detective Superintendent Ed Williams, has exposed a catalogue of errors in the policing of paedophilia. During his eight-month inquiry, Williams found that
* police had lost track of active paedophiles because national computer records were out of date and unreliable;
* hundreds of dossiers on serious offenders had been lost, including files on all three paedophiles convicted over Daniel Handley’s death;
* serial sex offenders could attack without being detected because the police unit that was supposed to identify them consisted of only one man and a secretary;
* crucial records from the biggest paedophile inquiry in London’s history had been mislaid.
Williams, who retired from Scotland Yard last autumn, fears that paedophilia is largely an invisible crime, unreported by most of its child victims, and that police are failing to detect it on a large scale. “The response is inadequate,” he warns. “The police response to property crimes is OK. But what are they doing about crimes that mark people for the rest of their lives?” In speaking out publicly, he is echoing fears that that have been raised internally over the last ten years by a series of other officers who specialised in the policing of sex offenders.
By the time he took over the inquiry into the disappearance of Daniel Handley, in October 1994, Ed Williams was one of the most experienced child abuse officers in the Metropolitan Police. As a young detective he had worked under ‘Nipper’ Read and the ‘Old Grey Fox’, Bert Wickstead, on the abduction of Susan Blatchford and Gary Hanlyn. He had gone on to head the child abuse team at Woodford, to set up other similar teams in north London, to investigate the abduction of a 13-year-old girl who was forced into a prostitution and, most important, to take a three-year degree in psychology.
One of his first moves in the Handley inquiry was to contact NCIS, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, to get access to the central data base on all convicted paedophiles. NCIS had taken over this information from Scotland Yard’s Obscene Publications Squad three years earlier but whereas the Yard detectives had continued to update it, NCIS had been denied the funds for their own operational arm and had simply stored the information.
Williams wanted the names and addresses of any known paedophiles within a radius of the street where Daniel Handley had been abducted. If the intelligence had been accurate, this would have put him on to the trail of all three men who were eventually to be convicted – one lived in the area, the other two worked there. But when the intelligence arrived, it was out-of-date and unreliable, and it contained no clue to the presence of the three guilty men.
“There was a lot of spurious and unvalidated information. They were giving us people who had moved away without them knowing it, people who had died without them knowing it, some very high profile paedophiles who had been re-convicted and sent to prison except that their files didn’t mention it. One notorious paedophile who had been living on the patch had moved down to Kent, but they had no record of that. And, of course, there was no record of paedophiles who had moved into the area in the previous two or three years. Frankly, it was a hindrance to our inquiry.”
From the outset, Williams considered the possibility that the men who had abducted Daniel might be linked to the Operation Orchid inquiry in the mid 1980s when police found that a network of paedophiles had abducted, raped and murdered boys from the East End of London, including Jason Swift, Barry Lewis and Mark Tildesley. Although the Orchid inquiry ended with the conviction of four men, its senior officers identified other possible suspects who escaped the net. But when Ed Williams tried to consult the Orchid files, he ran into complete confusion.
“I said ‘What has happened to all the intelligence from Orchid?’. The answer was ‘Nothing’. No one had been responsible for analysing it. No-one had done anything with it. It was supposed to be on a data base somewhere. I spent hours and hours trying to get hold of the original reports. The intelligence branch, SO 11, told me it had been wiped – they just didn’t have it. And then by sheer luck, it turned out that one of our typists in our station had worked on Orchid and she knew where to find some of it. This was the major inquiry into paedophile abuse in London; it should have been ready and available, it should already have been taught to people like me. But it wasn’t.”
Months later, Williams eventually discovered that there were indeed indirect links between the Orchid paedophiles and Daniel’s attackers. They had used the same technique to abduct young boys – carrying a map and asking directions; both groups had carried tranquilisers – temazepam was found in the bodies of two of the Orchid victims, and largactyl was found in the coat pocket of Tim Morss, who abducted Daniel Handley. Williams later discovered that all three of the guilty men had had the chance to borrow techniques from the Orchid killers because one of their friends was a sex offender who had shared a prison cell with one of the Orchid paedophiles, Sidney Cooke. But at the time, the vital clues that could have led him to this trail were missing.
Det Supt Williams was alarmed by these failings because, like other specialists in child abuse, he believed the crime was dangerously widespread and that the police response was inadequate. Scotland Yard’s specialist paedophile squad has 4,000 known active child abusers on its files, and only 17 officers to investigate them – less than a tenth of the number of officers who specialise in armed robbers or drug dealers.
When Det Supt Mike Hames retired as the head of the paedophile squad a year ago, he submitted a confidential report to the Commissioner arguing that the squad had to have more resources and had to start targeting known paedophiles, as the Flying Squad targets known robbers, catching them before they commit crimes. It was not good enough, Hames said, simply to wait for children to report their abuse or only to follow up the evidence that was found in seized child porn. However, his report was rejected.
Five years earlier, one of his predecessors, Iain Donaldson, who ran the squad from 1985 to 1989, had mounted exactly the same argument in a formal proposal, entitled “The Investigation of Multiple Offences of Child Exploitation Outside the Family”. That report, too, was rejected
In 1986, Det Chief Supt Roger Gaspar produced an internal paper called “People not Property” in which he described how he had followed up one allegation by one social worker in Kilburn and ended up dealing with 653 complaints of paedophilia and charging 20 different adults with serious offences against children. Gaspar tried to alert Scotland Yard to the hidden scale of unreported paedophilia. He pointed out that almost all Scotland Yard’s specialist squads were devoted to protecting property – arts and antiques, cheques, counterfeit currency, stolen cars, frauds, robberies, burglaries – and he asked for a squad to protect young people by going out and gathering intelligence on paedophiles and then targetting them.
Gaspar and his deputy, John Lewis, presented their paper to the Association of Chief Police Officers and to the men who were then in charge of serious crime at Scotland Yard, but it was rejected. Shortly afterwards Detective Chief Superintendent Gaspar was put in charge of stolen cars.
Ed Williams knew all this. “It’s almost as though guys like me and Hames and Gaspar are seen as nuisance value to the police service. Child protection is not macho. Those who are involved in it are looked at askance by Met police officers. They don’t have the same status as Regional Crime Squad or Flying Squad.” Williams was once told to his face by a friendly senior detective that if he ever wanted to make a success of himself, he had to drop ‘this child abuse business’. He had been worried when he attended a course in the management of serious crime to find no reference to the investigation of paedophilia.
As he ploughed into the Handley inquiry, Williams saw again the signs of Scotland Yard’s official indifference to child abuse. In his search for a lead on Daniel Handley, he turned to the Scientific Intelligence Unit, which is attached to the Yard’s intelligence section, SO11. Its job is to analyse evidence and intelligence on serious sex offences in order to identify serial offenders. It turned out that the Home Office had provided funds for only one detective sergeant and one administrative officer to back him up. “It is outrageous. One officer cannot possibly absorb and assimilate all of the data that comes in from the whole metropolitan area. And in addition he is supposed to be going out and talking to the intelligence bureaux in each of the five force areas. It’s an impossible task. So we are picking up some serial rapists in London – but not all of them.”
When he succeeded in breaking through and identifying three suspects, he tried to research their history to find out their sexual preferences and ways of operating. All three men had been convicted of child abuse, but when he tried to locate the case papers for Tim Morss and Brett Tyler, he found that their files were alarmingly incomplete. Crucial papers had simply gone missing. And when he applied for the case papers on David Guttridge, there was nothing at all.
Williams was not even surprised. Shortly before he took over the Handley case, he had tried to carry out a survey of serious sex offenders in one of Scotland Yard’s five operational areas. The General Archive was supposed to contain dockets on every offence which had come to trial or which had been investigated and abandoned without a solution. Williams found that more than 30% of files involving serious offences were simply nowhere to be found.
During the inquiry, Williams found that the problems extended beyond Scotland Yard. When the boy’s body was found near Bristol, he went to Avon and Somerset police to ask what they knew about paedophiles living in their area. They said they thought there were none but they were willing to look and when they started to collate the names of convicted child abusers in the city, they found literally hundreds and threw all their effort into following up this new intelligence. “They were a bit shocked. But it’s not because Bristol is particularly prone to paedophilia but simply because in every city in the country, there are hundreds of known paedophiles. And very often, the police are unaware of them.”
He also discovered that early in 1995, at a point when his operation was desperate for a break-through, David Guttridge had called a psychiatrist who specialised in child abuse to report that his boyfriend, Tim Morss, had ‘done something dreadful’. The psychiatrist had failed to take any action, apparently because he considered the information to be confidential. If police had questioned Guttridge, they would have discovered then that Morss had confessed to him his role in the rape and murder of Daniel Handley.
The Handley inquiry turned out to be Ed Williams’ last case. In September 1995, four months after arresting his three suspects, he retired. Before he left Scotland Yard, he submitted a six-page internal report, urging the Metropolitan Police to target paedophiles instead of waiting for them to commit offences. He made a series of specific recommendations: sex offenders should not be imprisoned with others with whom they can trade fantasies and techniques; paedophile prisoners should be released on licence and required to report changes of address and employment; police should train their own detectives in ‘offender profiling’ instead of relying on outside psychiatrists; police should work much more closely with prison psychiatrists, who should be required to divulge signs of dangerous behaviour in their patients.
The report was not welcomed. Williams had planned to follow it up with a second, more detailed proposal, but he decided there really was no point. Since then, the Home Office has suggested that it will consider requiring convicted paedophiles to report changes in their address and employment. For the rest, there is no sign of change. Williams’ verdict is clear: “We are not doing enough.”