“Almost complete breakdown” in London’s response to Yardies

The Guardian, 3 February 1997

Marcia Lawes was 24 years old. She lived in a small flat in a quiet street on the edge of Brixton in south London with her two-year-old son, Cassius, and her baby daughter, Malika. She had no work and she had no partner and in the past she had suffered from a crippling depression, but she stayed in touch with her family, particularly with her elder sister, Mercy, and she was beginning to make a life for herself.

On Friday April 21 1995, just after half past seven in the evening, Marcia Lawes was found dead in the hallway inside the front door of her flat. Her children had been staying with a child-minder down the road, and she had been on her own. No-one had seen her for three days and it was her sister, Mercy, who had started to worry and who had taken some friends to find out what was happening.

When they forced open the door of her first-floor flat, Mercy saw Marcia lying sprawled across the hall carpet on her back, with many stab wounds deep in her chest and throat. Her clothes were dishevelled and it was apparent from the outset that she had been the victim of some kind of sexual attack.

Just over a year later, a Jamaican immigrant, Delroy ‘Epsi’ Denton, aged 35, was convicted of murdering Marcia Lawes and jailed for life. When Denton’s trial was over, there was a flutter of low-key publicity disclosing that he had been working as an informer for Scotland Yard. The Yard said nothing. What was not disclosed was that Denton was the beneficiary of a secret ‘squeal deal’: in exchange for providing intelligence about other Jamaican gangsters in London, he had been allowed to remain in the country even though he was an illegal immigrant whose request to stay had been formally denied by the Home Office and even though it was well known that he was an unusually dangerous gangster. Marcia Lawes died because police and civil servants bent the law.

And Denton was not alone. A joint inquiry by The Guardian with Granada TV’s World In Action has disclosed that he is one of a series of Jamaican Yardie gangsters who have been granted an illegal stay in Britain in exchange for informing on their partners in crime and who have gone on to indulge in an orgy of offending. These ‘squeal deals’ are part of a wider picture of disarray in the Metropolitan Police, who have confronted a ruthless enemy with a strategy of chaos.

In the background, innocent Jamaicans in London complain that they have been pressurised to become informers by officials who have threatened to deport them unfairly unless they agree to provide information about their friends and neighbours.

It is ten years now since Scotland Yard began to realise that the Yardies were spreading out from their stronghold in Kingston, Jamaica where they run whole areas of the city in league with corrupt politicians and policemen. By 1987, there were blood-chilling reports from the United States, where agencies logged more than 600 Yardie murders in the previous three years and estimated that they were earning up to $9 million per month per city from the sale of crack cocaine. In one incident, a New York drug dealer tried to steal three ounces of cocaine from some Yardies: he was swiftly killed and his decapitated head was wrapped in masking tape and used in a celebratory game of football.

By 1987, they were making their presence felt in London, pumping crack cocaine into black housing estates, and using guns and knives with terrifying spontaneity. In response, the Metropolitan Police set off on a crazy zig-zag of policy, one year attacking the enemy, the next year denying they were a threat at all. In March 1988, they started Operation Lucy. By the middle of 1989, they had inflicted 400 arrests and 50 deportations on the London Yardies; their commander, Roy Ramm, had circulated confidential reports warning that the Yardies had “in my view, found a gap in the force’s structures” and appealing for a permanent squad to deal with the threat. The senior management’s response was simple: they shut down Operation Lucy, apparently nervous that they would be accused of racism if they continued to target the black gangsters.

1990 saw a new Yardie squad composed of Customs and police. By August, it was killed off, the victim of weak senior management and hopeless bickering between the two groups. August 1991 saw the launch of Operation Dalehouse under Detective Superintendent John Jones. It seized more than £1 million of crack from Yardies and made 274 arrests often for attacks on black victims. In November 1992, it, too, was killed off. John Jones feared that part of the problem was that black victims of crime attracted little press attention and, therefore, tempted the policy-makers at Scotland Yard to ignore them.

And all the time that the generals at Scotland Yard were ordering their footsoldiers to retreat, there were more Yardies flowing into London: using a red-hot iron on a rebellious woman courier; strangling a senior official from the US Embassy’s visa section to stop her exposing a phony visa racket; shooting police officers; running prostitutes and extortion rackets; and pushing millions of pounds of crack cocaine onto the streets.

A report for the National Criminal Intelligence Service last year referred to ‘the enormity of the problem within London’ and traced Yardies to cities all over the country, adding: “Police in the outlying areas surrounding these cities, such as Cheltenham in the West, Wolverhampton in the Midlands and Luton in the South are all reporting problems of drug-related violence.” One Yardie had wounded rivals in London, murdered a man in Birmingham, paralysed another and then moved to Wolverhampton where he murdered once more. The intelligence report ended on a startling note: “By the very nature of their stranglehold on the crack cocaine market, they are a threat to the security and stability of the nation.”

In the spring of 1993, one of the most experienced detectives in London got his hands on the problem. Detective Chief Superintendent Roy Clark (who has since been promoted to Deputy Assistant Commissioner) produced a confidential report which was a devastating expose of the Yard’s behaviour.

Clark found a hard core of half-a-dozen detectives and immigration officers who were still trying to tackle the Yardies. They had no office and no facilities and were reduced to using the bar of a small pub in Southwark where, masked by the sound of the television and the babble of after-work drinkers, they swapped intelligence and tried to cobble together a strategy. This makeshift office was so well used that they referred to it as ‘the annexe’ and even installed a fax machine behind the bar, where the landlord periodically tripped over it. Clarke found officers had been forced to spend their own money to fund operations.

In Jamaica, he found the two Drug Liaison Officers at the British High Commission pleading for a Polaroid camera so that they could fax pictures of suspect Yardies to London and have them stopped at the airport; the Foreign Office had refused to pay up.

He found Yardie intelligence was scattered through at least eight different squads, some of them defunct. He came across corruption in the Jamaican police force and among senior Jamaican politicians and heard of $33 million in US aid which had been stolen by politicians and given to Yardie gangs. He found Yardies cruising through British airports with false papers, occasionally being expelled only to come straight back again within weeks on new papers. On one occasion, one of the Yardie’s foremost killers, known as Tuffy, was stopped by immigration officers at Birmingham airport and simply barged his way past them, ran through the terminal and disappeared. He was later shot to death in south London by other Yardies.

Roy Clark’s conclusion was damning. “There has been,” he wrote, “an almost complete breakdown of the Metropolitan police strategic response and of the formal intelligence gathering and development structure.” He made 35 recommendations for London to rebuild its defences against the Jamaican gangs, and he warned: “It has been made abundantly clear by all I have spoken to that unless there is a consistent, aggressive and long-term strategy to deal with Jamaican criminals in London, there will be ever and sharply-increasing incidents of murder, violence, drug-related crime and crack availability.” He added pointedly that one of the reasons why London had become a magnet for Yardies was that “they see the police as less of a threat than elsewhere”. Things had been bad. Now, despite Roy Clark’s efforts, they stayed bad.

One of Clark’s most imaginative proposals was that a Yardie informer named Eaton Green should be flown out of London to Jamaica so that he could spend a month gathering intelligence in Kingston. Clark had no way of knowing that Green was already running out of control, manipulating his handlers in Brixton and routinely breaking the law. On July 8 1993, only two days after Clark signed his report, Eaton Green was arrested by detectives from Nottingham, charged with the biggest armed robbery in the history of the city and (eventually, in spite of obstructive behaviour from Scotland Yard) sent to prison.

The policy-makers at Scotland Yard then side-lined a substantial number of Clark’s 35 recommendations. Although they accepted his main point and set up a new unit to attack the Yardies – discreetly named the Drug Related Violence Intelligence Unit to avoid triggering complaints of racism – they starved it of power and leadership.

It was based within Scotland Yard’s intelligence department, SO11, but its front-line specialist was a constable from Brixton, Steve Barker, known on the streets as John Wayne. He had never qualified as a detective. By chance he had stumbled into the Yardies and he was now left to tackle this enemy with the minimum of supervision and support. He was to liaise with an immigration enforcement officer, a gritty Scot named Brian Fotheringham, who had no specialist training, no power of arrest, no firearms, no surveillance equipment, no interview rooms, no back-up and virtually no money. The new unit opened in August 1993. Within weeks, it had run into trouble.

On a trip to Jamaica in the summer of 1993, Constable Steve Barker had been introduced to a professional man who was respected by the Yardies and who had spied on them for the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacoo and Firearms. Barker suggested that that this man should visit London where he could infiltrate the capital’s Yardies and produce a detailed report. The new unit accepted the plan and code-named him Andrew Gold. The problems began immediately.

The Yard’s senior management saw Gold as an intelligence agent who would work to their agenda. They had not realised that he was a Yardie in his own right, a drug-dealer and a killer who had hired himself out as an assassin to corrupt Jamaican politicians. Nor did they realise that he was a con man and that his career as an informer for the Americans had ended in scandal when he was caught trying to claim reward money for phony information.

Soon after Gold arrived in London, some of them discovered the truth when by sheer chance, Gold’s American handler, a Miami drugs investigator named JJ Watterson, walked into a yuppie pub in the docklands and found his disgraced informer playing pool with detectives from Scotland Yard. Waterson was shocked. “It was almost as though he was another one of the boys – as if he was a police officer and not an informer,” he told us.

Watterson was even more shocked when he discovered that Gold was living a life of indulgence, driving around in a Golf GTI, eating expensive meals, drinking fine wines, playing golf, making endless transatlantic phone calls and sleeping in a luxury furnished flat with a view of the Thames – all supplied at the British tax-payer’s expense.

Furthermore, as JJ Watterson subsequently discovered, Gold had entered the United Kingdom illegally, travelling on a false passport with a second set of illegal papers in his suitcase. This had evidently involved very little risk since it transpired that SO11 had sent officers to the airport to wave him through passport control without hassle. And, in return for these privileges, Gold was providing no intelligence at all.

He complained to Watterson that Scotland Yard kept changing their minds about what they wanted him to do: first they had said he should simply hang out with the Yardies and produce a report; then they had asked him to set up a drugs importation, but operational detectives had pointed out that British law would not allow Gold to set up deals as he had in the USA; finally, they had asked him to buy some guns from a notorious arms dealer in south London, but the deal had fallen through. Watterson says he warned Gold’s handlers that “he was a slimy bastard and couldn’t be trusted”. Gold simply carried on enjoying himself for the best part of four months.

Before Gold finally went home, in January 1994, he produced a report on the Yardies in London which, according to one of those who knows its contents “could have been turned out by any of the London informers for a hundred pounds”. He then flew back to Jamaica with a cash bonus in his pocket, leaving behind him a bill for the tax-payer of more than £30,000. He left the country as he had arrived, illegally. Later, he boasted to friends in Jamaica that he discovered he had accidentally left one of his false passports behind in London – but the Metropolitan Police had kindly sent the illegal paperwork on to him by post.

In December 1993, there as an outcry after an entire plane-load of 323 Jamaicans was detained at Gatwick Airport and screened by police and immigration officers. Dozens were held overnight, and 27 passengers were eventually deported to Jamaica on Christmas Day. The government was bombarded with complaints that Jamaicans were being targeted in a racist way. However, a Home Office minister, Charles Wardle insisted that the plane had not been targeted at all. “There was no picking on any flight,” he said. “It is a routine matter.” The Prime Minister, John Major, similarly wrote to the Labour MP Max Madden to assure him that the Jamaican plane had not been singled out. But this was not true. The Home Office Minister and the Prime Minister had been misled.

The whole operation was run by the new unit at SO11, who had deliberately targeted the flight and brought along Brian Fotheringham to help them look for Yardie suspects. The operation had been planned in advance: a lounge had been set aside to process the passengers, and a supply of biscuits and water had been laid on. They had done the same thing to another Jamaican flight a week earlier. The operation was hopelessly clumsy, and somebody somewhere found it easier to mislead government ministers than to admit the truth.

On May 12 1994, police raided the Atlantic pub in Brixton. Brian Fotheringham was in the background of the raid looking for illegal Yardies and he became suspicious of a slim, young Jamaican who had been found in possession of a knife and who said he was a British national called Clive Lloyd Johnson. Fotheringham had come across that name before being falsely used by other Yardies. He advised the police not to release the man on bail, traced the real Clive Johnson and the next day, he went back to the police station to interview the impostor.

The man put up a good verbal fight, offering two further false identities before finally admitting that his real name was Delroy Denton, then aged 33, known on the streets as Epsi; that he had served prison sentences in Jamaica for firearms and armed robbery; and that in April 1994 he had lied his way into the United Kingdom in one false name and had since been signing on for social security in another. Now Brian Fotheringham recognised him. He had seen Denton’s name in police intelligence reports which described him as a murderous participant in street wars, the founder of a Kingston gang known as the Rapid Possee. When Denton then claimed that his life was in danger from corrupt politicians in Jamaica and applied for political asylum, Fotheringham knew exactly what he had to do.

He immediately wrote a file note: “We need long-term detention (secure) on this one.” He then filled in a standard form to give reasons for the detention: “Subject dangerous Jamaican criminal, given 16 years in Jamaica for firearms/aggravated burglary offences. Entered on false ID. Has been claiming in yet another false ID. Very dangerous individual.” To stress his point, he underlined the word ‘very’ and then completed a special Exceptional Risk Form to warn the Metropolitan Police of the presence in London of this unusually dangerous man. On this form, he ticked two boxes to record his view of Denton’s character: “He is associated with a dangerous gang” and “He is of an extremely violent nature”. Denton might buy himself a short stay in Britain with his asylum application, but Fotheringham would ensure that he spent the time behind bars. Then an odd thing happened.

Fotheringham had a conversation with Steve Barker from SO11. The next day, May 14, he wrote a new file note, in which he completely reversed his position. There was, he wrote, “no realistic chance of long-term detention on this man”. Furthermore, he suggested, Denton was no longer dangerous: “PC Barker has stated intelligence has shown that subject has not been involved in any serious criminal matters since being here.” The notes did not explain how PC Barker reconciled this opinion with his knowledge of Denton’s record in Jamaica. And there was one other thing which the notes did not record: on that day, Delroy Denton had agreed to become an informer. If Fotheringham stuck to his plan to detain him, he and Barker would gain nothing from him. That night, this ‘very dangerous individual’ was allowed to walk out of custody, back on to the streets of London.

Some of Denton’s closest associates were none too pleased to see him. They had heard him boast about the girl he had throttled in a phone box, about the political opponents he had shot down, about the woman he wanted to murder and embalm so that he could use her how he wanted. Several of them had heard him dreaming out loud about how he would like to tell a man and a woman that he was going to kill them, then order them to strip and have sex, and then when the man was too scared to perform, he would rape the woman himself before he blew out both their brains. Some of them had heard him at night, pacing the floor, praying to himself, muttering at visions of his victims. One or two of them knew that he kept a list of the women he had slept with and the things he had persuaded them to do. And now he was free again.

The Home Office started to investigate Denton’s application for asylum. Four months later, on September 13, Mrs B McDermott of the asylum section produced a detailed memo listing the reasons for refusing it; a second official added a hand-written note that this was “a particularly weak claim”. In December, they produced a formal letter for Denton, telling him he had been rejected, and they sent it to Brian Fotheringham’s section so that it could be served on Denton, clearing the way for him to be deported. Then another odd thing happened. The letter simply stayed in the file.

That same month, on December 19 1994, a south London woman called the local police to report that her daughter, a 15-year-old convent school girl, had been raped. The girl described how she and three friends used to laugh with a man who sometimes saw them at the bus stop on their way home from school and that day, they had decided to skip school and go round to his flat. They had drunk some wine and smoked a joint, and she had fallen asleep. Her friends had gone off and she had woken up to find this man forcing himself upon her. She had struggled and pleaded but she had been unable to stop him. His name was Delroy Denton.

When police went to his home, Denton ran, but he was caught and charged with rape and remanded in custody. Six weeks later, on February 1 1995, the Crown Prosecution Service dropped the rape charge on grounds of insufficient evidence and declined to prosecute him for having sex with an under-aged girl because she was not a virgin and, therefore, could not be said to have been corrupted. However controversial this decision may have been, Denton went back out on the streets of London.

Three and a half months later, he was still free, carrying the mobile phone that Scotland Yard had bought for him, spending the weekly cash allowance which they gave him, signing on without declaring the money, smoking dope and crack, contacting Steve Barker from time to time to feed him information about his friends. The letter from the Home Office was still lying in a file in Brian Fotheringham’s section. And then, one grey April morning, Delroy Denton talked his way into Marcia Lawes’ flat and raped her and stabbed her over and over again, in the neck and chest and shoulders, until she lay dead on the floor of her hallway.

It did not take the detectives from the Number Five Area Major Investigation Pool very long to catch him. They questioned all of Marcia’s friends and took blood samples from men who knew her to match the DNA against the semen on her body. On May 9, they questioned Denton. On June 28, they arrested him. On June 29 they charged him with murder. Three months later, on October 29 1995, the Crown Prosecution Service dropped the charge on the grounds that, in the opinion of senior Treasury counsel, there was insufficient evidence.

The AMIP detectives who had investigated the rape were alarmed to see him walk free. They knew he was an illegal immigrant and that his application for asylum had been refused by the Home Office, so they contacted Brian Fotheringham and asked him to get Denton detained. Fotheringham refused. The Home Office letter remained in its file. Denton remained on the streets. The AMIP detectives also knew that Denton was working for SO11 and so they contacted Steve Barker’s senior officers and advised that Denton should no longer be used as a registered informer. Denton was struck off the register – but nevertheless, with SO11’s knowledge, PC Barker continued to meet him and to use him as a source of intelligence.

For two months Denton continued his old life, using and dealing crack cocaine and grass, stealing and on one occasion attempting to rape a young girl called Debbie. However, he was unaware that the AMIP detectives were still working on him and, on December 23 1995 , they arrested him once more. This time, they had extra evidence. Denton was held in prison from where he sent urgent messages to Steve Barker asking for help. This time, the door stayed shut. In July 1996, he was jailed for life.

The Home Office letter never was served on him. An immigration source who knows Brian Fotheringham’s work admits that Denton’s treatment was part of a pattern: “There was an unwritten policy of co-operation between the police and the immigration service. We rely on the police for our existence. We want police to make our arrests, we want police cells to hold people in custody, we need police interview rooms and vehicles. In return, there are certain things that go on. Fotheringham was trying to improve the relationship by doing favours. He was in an impossible position: as an enforcement officer, he has to throw these people out but as an informant-handler, he has to protect them keep a good relationship with them.

“One way of helping the police was you could ignore a situation, you could sit on a file, turn a blind eye. Agreements were made that a file would remain half way down the pipeline. It was all based on trust. You might be out on an operation with police and they would point to some of the people they’d nicked and say ‘Don’t bother with this lot’. If the police request us to delay action, we would delay action. It was common practice to avail the police when we could. At management level they chose to ignore what was going on. But they knew.”

Detective Superintendent John Jones, who led the successful Operation Dalehouse against the Yardies in 1991, confirms the existence of this unwritten policy: “I have no doubt that from time to time arrangements are made unofficially to allow a man’s detention by the immigration service to be delayed for a little while. I have known it to happen.” He said he thought it was rare and that it might also be in the public interest, but he acknowledged that it was illegal. “There’s no law that I know of that says ‘Well, in this particular instance, you may forget the Immigration Act for six months while this guy gives you some help.’”

Steve Barker’s most productive informer, Eaton Green, was allowed to stay in the UK even though he had jumped bail in Jamaica where he was due to face trial for attempted murder. On Brian Fotheringham’s advice, Green was given residence rights because he had married a British national: Fotheringham accepted that Green had fathered the woman’s child even though his name did not appear on the child’s birth certificate and the woman had apparently been pregnant for four months before she first met Green. Fotheringham subsequently explained that he had not checked the birth records but believed that the baby “looked just like Green”. Green went on to engage in a spectacular sequence of crimes on the streets of London, culminating in his jailing for the armed robbery in Nottingham.

Green was allowed to import two Yardie friends from Jamaica, Cecil Thomas, and Rohan ‘Bumpy’ Thomas, who had a history of shooting policemen. It was disclosed 18 months ago that on March 28 1993, the two men were allowed to enter the country even though Bumpy was travelling on a false passport and both men had long criminal records. Brian Fotheringham knew they were coming and checked the passenger list while they were en route. Steve Barker also knew: he allowed Green to use police telephones to contact his friends in Jamaica. Fotheringham has testified on oath that Barker was at Gatwick Airport for their arrival; Barker denies this but claims he has lost the internal paperwork which would prove his whereabouts on the day. Bumpy was later jailed for the same armed robbery in Nottingham having first tried to pull a gun on the Stoke Newington police who arrested him.

It is not known how many Yardies have been been allowed to stay illegally in the UK nor how many crimes they went on to commit. It is clear, however, that the management problems with the operation against them continued. By last year, SO11 had been forced to recognise that most of the intelligence which they were passing to Area Drugs Squads in London was going to waste. The drugs squads were often simply too busy with their own work to make SO11’s arrests for them. In the background, Scotland Yard’s policy makers blocked a series of anti-Yardie initiatives which had been proposed by front-line officers. Morale started to fall and then plummeted during one final disaster.

During his time on the streets of London, Eaton Green had never been brought to book even though he was arrested after shooting a man known as Stepper Dan; caught by doctors with crack cocaine in his pocket; and held on a drugs raid. In March 1993, Stoke Newington officers abandoned a major operation against Green, who was using a firearm on their patch, after Steve Barker told them he was an informer and pleaded for delay. When Nottingham detectives were trying to arrest Green for armed robbery, Barker met him and allowed him to walk away. Two weeks before he was arrested, Green went to Holland and used an Uzi sub-machine gun to rob drug dealers; he claims his fares were paid by Scotland Yard who wanted him to gather intelligence while he was there. When Green was finally brought to trial, it was disclosed that Scotland Yard had concealed evidence from their Nottingham colleagues, from the Crown Prosecution Service and the court; and that they had attempted to abort Green’s trial.

Soon after Green was finally jailed, in October 1995, for the armed robbery in Nottingham, SO11 moved him into a safe house, where he confessed to a startling catalogue of crime in the United Kingdom including conspiracy to rob a post office, drug offences, armed robberies, shootings and protection rackets. Dealing with his time in Jamaica, he described in detail numerous armed robberies and shootings and, in particular, how he had murdered eleven people, including one incident where he claimed that, on the instructions of a very senior politician, he had shot down three fellow Yardies who were suspected of talking to the police. In doing this, he said, he was seen by a passing taxi and so he also shot dead the taxi driver and his passenger.

Confronted with this, Scotland Yard once more failed to enforce the law. They failed to tell Interpol or the Jamaican authorities of his confessions to murder; they failed to set up a team to link his confessions to reported UK crimes; they failed to pass a report to the Crown Prosecution Service; indeed, they had failed during the weeks of his confession even to caution him, the essential legal prerequisite for using any of his admissions in evidence against him. Instead, Scotland Yard contacted the Parole Board and the Immigration Department to try to arrange for this multiple killer to be given early parole and to be allowed to remain in the UK. In the meantime, Green has since told friends, they paid him a reward and, in an attempt to re-establish his credibility in Jamaica, they used public funds to send a series of bribes on his behalf to a corrupt police officer in Kingston.

Once again, all SO11’s plans collapsed in disarray. The outline of Green’s confession was leaked to The Guardian; the Home Office then refused to give him parole and ordered his eventual deportation. Since then, we have done what Scotland Yard should have done and checked his confession in Jamaica: it turns out that chunks of it are fiction, an apparent attempt to increase his status with the Yard. And in Kingston, a corrupt Jamaican police officer has pocketed the cash which Scotland Yard generously sent him.