This is the story of two kings. The first comes from humble origins, a street kid from New York, whose father died when he was a child, who learned to deal and steal for a living and who dreamed that one day he would be rich and powerful, and who finally found himself a throne as one of the world’s wealthiest and most successful criminals, a King of Cocaine.
Last week, Carlos Lehder was deposed from that throne when a jury in Jacksonville, Florida convicted him on a sample charge of smuggling 3.3 tons of cocaine into the United States. His seven-month trial was a volatile affair in which his own extravagant criminality was often dwarfed by the flagrant dishonesty of the agencies and governments who were supposed to be fighting him. Even in exile, he remains the key to a clutch of scandals.
Lehder, who is now 39, has always specialised in smuggling. As a teenager, he smuggled Chevrolet cars into Colombia, where his mother had family ties. Then he smuggled marijuana into the United States until he was caught with 237 lbs of the stuff. While he was serving his sentence in a federal prison in Connecticut, he used the prison library to devise the scheme that was to carry him to power.
It was simple enough. When he was released in 1975, he approached the families who controlled the production of cocaine around the city of Medellin in Colombia and persuaded them to join forces and to use him as their American salesman. They agreed and formed the now notorious Medellin Cartel. At first, Lehder employed women couriers with suitcases to smuggle the cocaine into the US. But the demand was insatiable; he once had to bundle his mother on to a plane with eight kilos of cocaine in a bag to meet an emergency order in Los Angeles. “Everybody has to work,” he later explained, “and she wanted a free trip to Disneyland.”
Later, the cartel built underground labs to process the coca leaves and used light planes to fly the cocaine to the Bahamian island of Norman’s Cay, which Lehder had bought for cash in 1978 as a staging post. From there, Lehder’s pilots would merge with the scores of other private planes flying to the American mainland, concentrating on the weekends when they knew the customs officers would be distracted by Wide World of Sports on television. Soon the cartel was the biggest drugs ring in the world, supplying 80% of cocaine for the US market.
“Carlos Lehder and Henry Ford have a lot in common,” according to US attorney Robert ‘Mad Dog’ Merkle, who led the successful prosecution of Lehder: “Henry Ford pioneered the mass manufacture of automobiles. Carlos Lehder pioneered the mass transportation of cocaine.” But Lehder was a lot bigger than Ford.
His personal wealth runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, a dozen haciendas, three planes, a block of flats and a Bavarian style castle in the Medellin hinterland with its own discotheque crowned by a statue of Lehder’s hero, John Lennon, complete with guitar and bullet holes. The cartel’s annual income is now reckoned to be between seven and ten billion dollars a year, which makes it richer than the Colombian government and, in the words of a former President of Colombia, ‘stronger than the state’.
The cartel’s power is fabulous. An assistant administrator from the US Drugs Enforcement Agency, David Westrate, declared last month that: “I think we’ve lost Colombia or we’re on the verge of losing it to the cartel.” For example, the extradition treaty under which Lehder was arrested in Colombia last year and sent to the US for trial, has since been scrapped under pressure from the cartel, and the attorney general who supported it has been murdered.
Some of the power is based on fear. Lehder and his colleagues have been implicated in an assault on the Colombian Supreme Court in 1985 in which 97 people died, as well as the assassination of a justice minister, an ambassador in Hungary, scores of left-wing politicians, union leaders, policemen, editors and others who dared to stand in the cartel’s way. But its greatest power is financial. When the Colombian Government tried to crack down on the cartel in 1984, the cocaine dealers replied by offering to pay off the national debt. The offer was refused.
Lehder’s cartel and its money is at the heart of the scandal over Panamanian General Manuel Noriega who is alleged by former aides to have received $320 million in bribes for allowing the cartel to use Panamanian airports and banks and for disclosing the identities of American narcotics agents in the region.
Lehder’s trial and linked Congressional hearings have produced evidence of cartel bribes in the Bahamas, where the Prime Minister Sir Lynden Pindling is alleged to have been paid up to $5 million; in Haiti and Honduras where senior army officers have been named as cartel dealers; in Mexico, where the whole drug enforcement machine is said to be compromised; and even in Cuba where, according to two different sources, Fidel Castro has encouraged the cartel to export to the United States.
Perhaps most important from a political point of view, a growing queue of witnesses say that the cartel put money into the American operation to support the Contras in their war against the Government of Nicaragua, apparently in the hope of procuring another friendly regime. George Morales and Gary Betzner have testified that they flew weapons from the US to Costa Rica for the Contras and returned with consignments of cocaine. Three Contra leaders have said publicly that they received funds from the cartel and one says they gave fuel to cartel drug planes.
The cartel’s money launderer, Ramon Milian-Rodriguez, an elegant and cosmopolitan figure now serving a prison sentence in the US, says he personally laundered $10 million from cocaine sales for the Contras. Most damaging, he says he paid the money to a CIA agent who was in close contact with the office of Vice President George Bush. Which is where the second king comes into the story.
Unlike the brash young King of Cocaine, this second monarch is old and tired and deeply confused. He is a contemporary King Canute, slumped in his throne on the edge of a sea of narcotics, muttering, mumbling and wagging his finger at the waves, swearing the tide is turning, while all the time the current is swirling round his knees.
It is only a few months ago that President Reagan – for it is he – declared that the war against drugs was ‘an untold American success story’ and that drug use in the United States ‘has already gone out of style’. The waves kept coming. Last week, the old boy hitched up his trousers and scrambled up the beach, announcing as he retreated that the use of illegal drugs in the United States is ‘a national emergency requiring a new strategy backed by the armed forces and the death penalty.’
This was greeted with hoots of derision and cynical sneers not so much because of the complete turnaround in his story as because everyone in Washington knows that Reagan’s widely publicised war against drugs has always been fifty percent piffle, because the supposed enemy – the Medellin Cartel and its allies – are also to a greater or lesser extent Reagan’s allies.
Frank McNeil, who is a former US ambassador to Costa Rica and used to be the State Department’s deputy director of intelligence, says that evidence of General Noriega’s dealings with the cartel emerged in 1983, but the administration protected him because he was their ally against the Nicaraguans. Noriega was prepared to be a very good ally: he even offered to organise assassinations for Oliver North.
Similarly, McNeil says that a Honduran general, Jose Rosa, was known to have used $10 million of cocaine money to fund an attempt to assassinate his president, but that did not stop the Pentagon inviting the general to a lunch in his honour to encourage him to maintain his support for the Contras.
The simplest means at Reagan’s disposal for punishing governments which have been corrupted by the cartel is to refuse to certify that they have co-operated in the war against drugs. Ignoring the flood of evidence, however, Reagan has certified them all: the Bahamas, Haiti, Honduras and Mexico. He has also certified Bolivia which has not yet outlawed the production of cocaine; Peru, which has yet to prosecute a single major drug dealer; and even Colombia. He withdrew Panama’s certificate only after the embarrassing decision by a Miami grand jury to indict General Noriega.
In the case of Mexico, Reagan knew that the country was officially recognised as ‘the largest single-country source of the heroin and marijuana available in the US’ and that his own customs service had found its administration to be riddled with corruption. But the US Treasury had its eye on a different ball – the Mexican debt to American banks, whose repayment was not to be jeopardised. So the President forgot about the war against drugs and, on March 1, he certified Mexico, declaring dishonestly that it had ‘co-operated fully’ with American efforts against drug dealers.
But the old muddler is not alone in his confusion. A desperate uncertainty now pollutes the American debate about drug abuse. The White House is talking war and playing politics; Congress is taking an increasingly hard line, each party competing in ferocity and both doubtless entirely uninfluenced by the prospect of scoring votes in the Congressional elections in November. Meanwhile a group of city mayors and academics has dared to suggest that the whole war is phony, that drug prohibition in the 80s is no more successful than alcohol prohibition was in the 20s, and that legalising narcotics may be the only way to break the cartel and its many tentacles; meanwhile the flow of drugs continues unabated. Carlos Lehder must be smiling.
But at least the President has re-assured us. “We have turned the corner on drug addiction in the United States,” he said. No. That wasn’t President Reagan. That was President Nixon – fifteen years ago.