The ‘invisible inquiry’ which identified WPC Fletcher’s killer

The London Daily News, 26 June 1987

As WPC Yvonne Fletcher lay dying of her wounds on a pavement in St James’ Square, senior policemen made an immediate decision: they would storm the Libyan People’s Bureau to find her killer. They relayed their plan to the Home Office, whose reaction was just as clear: permission refused.

The police machine was stalled in its tracks. Eventually, the Anti Terrorist Branch were to mount an extraordinary and hitherto undisclosed operation to find the killer. But in the meantime, they could only nag at the edges of the case.

The young policewoman had fallen just after 10am on April 17 1984, when a burst of machine-gun fire raked the square where she was guarding an anti-Ghadaffi protest. Within minutes, the area was sealed off, and police began the seemingly impossible job of finding a killer with their hands tied behind their backs.

They riddled the People’s Bureau with electronic listening devices – poked them through walls, dangled them down chimneys, beamed them on to windows. But it was a very big, very solid building and they learned nothing to help them. Determined to try every angle, the Anti Terrorist Branch then organised searches of the drains and pipes beneath the Bureau three times a day, and brought in a forensic export to analyse their findings. But he found nothing.

The underlying problem for the Branch was that they were not running the operation. Strategy was being dictated by the Cabinet’s emergency committee, Cobra, chaired by the then Home Secretary, Leon Brittan. The police had no seat on Cobra and, although the Metropolitan Commissioner, Sir Kenneth Newman, went to some of its meetings, his was only one voice among many.

The Foreign Office was stressing the need to ensure the safety of its diplomats and of the 8,000 Britons in Libya. It also warned about damaging British trade with the Arab world. Cobra tried to tempt Ghadaffi with a compromise: would he waive diplomatic immunity for the killer alone, remove the killer to a mental asylum and apologise to the British Government? But Gadaffi was not to be tempted.

After five days, the Foreign Office won: there would be no storming the Bureau, no further attempt to identify the killer. Instead, Britain broke diplomatic relations with Libya and gave the 30 men in the Bureau a week to leave the country. It was bad news for the Anti Terrorist Branch, but there was a chink of light. The Anti Terrorist Branch used the departure of the 30 from the Bureau to pull off an unprecedented trick – an invisible inquiry. This involved some diplomatic double talk.

The Libyans would not be ‘detained’, nor would they be ‘interrogated’, but they would be offered a ‘safe rendezvous to meet their relatives’ where ‘immigration procedures’ could be observed. Nobody would subject them to a body search for weapons; but they would demonstrate their innocence by allowing themselves to be publicly frisked.

This gave the Anti Terrorist Branch the bare bones on which to build. So, when the 30 Libyans finally emerged into the blazing sun of St James’s Square on April 27, the police were a great deal busier than they appeared to be.

The Libyans came out in groups of five and walked across the square to be frisked. They might have noticed that the officers were careful not to stand in front of them – in case they got in the way of the police cameraman who was hidden across the square.

Their possessions were brought out in sealed bags, many of them provided by Scotland Yard. None could be searched. But the Yard’s bags were transparent, enabling them to be thoroughly examined. All were X-rayed and tested for traces of explosives.

The 30 men were then taken to ‘meet their relatives’ at the Civil Service College at Sunningdale. They were only there for six hours, but all provided names, addresses, and dates of birth to immigration officers.

Anti Terrorist Branch officers openly finger-printed the first man they dealt with, but the Libyan go-between supervising the operation objected. Still, they got the prints of 29 of the 30 men – by covering the table with a specially treated transparent film and replacing it after each interview.

In case there was any mistake, they then gave the Libyans a farewell traditional halal meal and held on to the dirty dishes. They now had enough information to open files on all 30 men, complete with mugshots and fingerprints. And it had all been done without ruffling a single diplomatic feather.

The next stage was to search the Bureau for clues. The place turned out to be a small arsenal – four revolvers (two loaded), three pistols (all loaded), 4,368 rounds of ammunition and eight sets of body armour. There were also two briefcases containing syringes and instructions on dosages of various drugs – apparently part of a kidnap kit.

But the most important finds were not visible to the naked eye: traces of explosive showed that a gun had been fired from a first floor window; in the same room, a spent 9mm cartridge from the type of bullet which killed Yvonne Fletcher; and, crucially, fingerprints.

Now, the inquiry began to pick up speed. Office workers in St James’s Square agreed that the Bureau’s first-floor windows were never normally open; witnesses agreed that a man had shut the window after the gunman had stopped firing; a fresh palm print on the window was cross-checked with the Squad’s new collection and identified. So Ali Jalid, a Bureau press officer, became suspect as an accessory to murder.

Armed with their 30 mug-shots, the Squad combed back through the witnesses to the shooting. One, a decorator, had noticed the man with the gun seconds before he fired and had given a clear description. They showed him the mug-shots and he picked out a student adviser, Abdel Gader Tuhami. But was he the right man?

The Branch then had some luck, obtaining a sudden flood of intelligence by a means which remains a closely guarded secret. It appeared that many of the leading figures from the Bureau had been at a party on the night before the shooting. They had talked about the demonstration planned for the next day, whether it would be stopped, what they would do if it went ahead. Late at night, news had come that the British were refusing to ban the demonstration.

A group of the guests were summoned to the Bureau. The meeting was chaired by the senior intelligence man, Moustafa Mghirbi. Mghirbi told them that Tripoli had given permission to fire on the demonstration. His plan was detailed: they would organise a counter-demonstration; when they heard the chant ‘Allah Akbar’ – God is Great – they would scatter to distract the police; a man with a Sterling sub-machine gun would fire from the first floor; snatch squads would then run out and drag stray demonstrators into the building. Mghirbi then appointed one of their number to fire the gun. He chose Abdel Gader Tuhami.

* After the Libyan People’s Bureau siege was over, the Anti Terrorist Branch searched the building and found seven guns and stocks of ammunition. Colonel Gadaffi claimed they had been planted by the British. However, by tracing the histories of the weapons, British and American authorities were able to establish the truth. For instance, three Colt .38 Cobras discovered in the hoard were traced back to the manufacturers. They had sold the guns in January 1976 to Jerry’s Sports Centre, Olyphanti, Pennsylvania. Jerry’s sold them to another gun store, in West Reading, Pennsylvania, where they were bought by Joseph G McElroy, an associate of the renegade CIA man Ed Wilson. Wilson smuggled the guns to Libya and sold them to Gadaffi’s intelligence service. On April 30 1984 they were found in a safe in the basement of the People’s Bureau in St James’s Square.