How Oliver North used Terry Waite as a cover for illegal arms deal

The London Daily News, 17 April 1987

YESTERDAY morning, the shop windows of Blackheath were speckled with white posters. Under the motif of a dove of peace, they urged: “Don’t Forget Terry Waite”. By the afternoon, they had gone.

A distraught Frances Waite, who has been living with the torment of her husband’s disappearance for nearly three months, visited every shop displaying a poster and explained that they were upsetting her family, who live near-by.

Mrs Waite’s anxiety is a desperate signal of the mood among those who are coping with her husband’s captivity but, more important, it is a clue to the tangle of powerful international interests which now appear to be combining to keep him there.

For the irony of Waite’s fate is that he is a humanitarian, essentially unpolitical figure who has been drawn into an overwhelmingly political morass. The man who put him there was Oliver North. Now, North’s exposure in the Irangate scandal appears to be producing overwhelming obstacles to his release.

Some of the obstacles have always been there for any British hostage. Chief among them is the resistance of the Foreign Office to involving itself in any operation to secure a hostage’s release. Unlike the Israelis, the Foreign Office has never taken military initiatives. And it has also done its best to avoid any kind of negotiation with hostage takers. The pattern has been for Whitehall officials to advise the families of hostages that they should do nothing, say nothing, and leave it to the diplomats. The diplomats then go away and conduct business as usual for fear of taking any step which might have awkward international repercussions.

When the Sunday Times journalist Jon Swain was kidnapped in Eritrea, the newspaper at first accepted the standard Foreign Office advice. After weeks of inactivity, they saw that nothing was being done and broke through the inertia by conducting their own inquiries and running stories. Swain was duly released while the Foreign Office was still sitting on its hands.

In the last five years, the one thing that has nudged the Foreign Office into deviating from this course has been the intervention of Terry Waite. And this was the root of Waite’s problem.

Although he was projected to the world as the man with the magic touch, who had the power of the honest amateur – and perhaps of God – to get results, the truth, it now seems, was a little more complicated.

His first steps on the fragmented surface of Middle East politics came after the Iranian revolution in 1980, when three British missionaries were arrested by the new regime. At Lambeth Palace he had a special responsibility for Anglicans abroad and, after suffering the usual weeks of Foreign Office inertia, he decided to visit Tehran himself.

The fact that he was able to win the release of the missionaries was certainly due to his personal touch with the Iranians, but it was also due to the Foreign Office’s willingness to go in behind him to make concessions to Tehran: as the missionaries returned to London, the body of an Iranian terrorist who had blown himself up in London nine months earlier was finally released and sent home. At this time, too, we now know, the British Government allowed the sale to Iran of valuable spare parts for their Chieftain tanks.

Four years later it was Libya, where four Britons were held under house arrest after the murder of WPC Fletcher by Libyans in London. Again there was the personal touch from Terry Waite who established a real rapport with Colonel Gadaffi. There was also, from the Foreign Office, a sudden decision to provide visas for Libyans who wanted to visit relatives in British prisons.

Then in 1985, Oliver North arrived on the scene. Waite had a genuine humanitarian concern for the hostages in Beirut and was willing to try the magic touch again. North had little faith in magic. Where the Foreign Office had been prepared to help Waite make his deals, North now went further and exploited him as cover for deals of a very different sort.

The report of the Tower Commission into North’s activities, published in February, discloses some of the detail. On November 12 1985, for example, North visited London and met Waite to talk about the timing of the release of hostages. On the same trip, North also met Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian businessman who set up the arms-for-hostages deals between North and Tehran.

There is no hard evidence as to whether Waite realised how he was being used. The Tower Commission found that North was using the Archbishop’s envoy as a source of intelligence, quoting his views in internal memos and referring to him as “our only access to events in Lebanon”. But principally, he used Waite as camouflage.

When Father Jenco was released from Beirut late last year, it was universally seen as another example of Waite’s skill. The Tower Report discloses the truth – that North spent October 30 and 31 overseeing the secret delivery of 500 anti-tank missiles to Tehran before manoeuvring Waite into position to bring out Jenco 48 hours later.

The day after Jenco’s release, a Beirut magazine broke the Irangate story, and North’s operation was engulfed in the ensuing scandal. But Terry Waite, the unpolitical humanitarian, still hoped to free the remaining hostages from Lebanon.

By the time he left his Beirut hotel on January 20, he was hopelessly compromised. At the worst, he was, in the eyes of Moslem groups, a CIA agent; at best, he was a CIA dupe who had lost his ability to deliver the goods. He has not been seen since.

In Washington, the whole American effort to release hostages has been neutralised by the Irangate scandal and, in London, the mandarins of the Foreign Office are more sure than ever than they should do nothing that might cause them trouble. Mrs Waite appears a lonely figure.