The natural stress of life in MI5

The Observer, 12 May 1985

Working in MI5 is not an easy life. The problems inherent in being an intelligence officer mean that it is vital for your superiors to be people to whom you can turn in confidence for help.

Last week the Security Commission published its analysis of why Michael Bettaney became a traitor and of what weaknesses in the service his case revealed.

Its report paints a picture of Bettaney as a man suffering from increasing stress and, eventually, a serious drink problem. It blames MI5’s personnel branch for failing to recognise this.

In fact, such a pattern ought to be recognised as a common feature of the lives of MI5’s officers. Stress is endemic in intelligence work. You are trained to be suspicious, to assume the worst motive in the simplest of actions – it is the very nature of the work.

Those attitudes can be very difficult to shake off at the end of the day, and you may find yourself doubting the honesty of a friend who tells you he is going out to buy a pint of milk – particularly as you are expected to lie to this same friend about the nature of your work.

New recruits are given no cover story to help them keep the nature of their work secret. They are told simply to say that they work for the Ministry of Defence and, if pressed, to say that the work is secret. It is made clear that it will be frowned upon if they slip up and let someone know what they do.

As a result it is very hard to talk to people. At a drinks party the first thing you ask a stranger is “What do you do?”

But recruits to MI5 soon learn not to ask this question for fear that they in turn will be asked, embroiling them in the complications of trying to answer it. Then come the doubts about the nature of your work: reading private letters, listening to telephone calls, which to some is distasteful.

Suddenly, at the age of 24, you have to decide whether to open a file on a fellow citizen. Your vetting assessment may ruin somebody’s career.

There are doubts about the legality of some of the work. It can be alarming for a recruit to be party to deliberate law-breaking, and particularly worrying to discover that it is ‘wrong’ to question such activity.

Like anyone else, Bettaney felt the stress of the job, particularly as he worked in Northern Ireland, where he was injured by a car bomb and had the unnerving experience of hiding in a house while in another room a man was having his kneecaps broken. Like many others, he began to drink.

As the commission says, his stress went unrecognised and untreated by his superiors, and eventually he became a traitor.

The issue which the commission tries to confront is the need for the service to cope with stress before it becomes a danger. The responsibility for handling staff problems lies with the personnel section—B branch. Every intelligence officer is assigned a member of B branch, who works as a combination of personal tutor and welfare officer.

In theory this branch officer copes with all your problems, emotional and professional. This means that the same person who deals with your personal worries also plans your future career.

But any intelligence officer is bound to be reluctant to share his or her problems with such an officer, for fear that such a sign of ‘weakness’ might be detrimental to the officer’s career.

The closed style of management in the service, defended by strict adherence to the need-to-know principles, means that the junior ranks are not involved in any way with the overall operation of the service . The bright young recruit often feels the work is futile. There is no outlet for initiative.

Much of what the commission suggests is valuable. It calls for a more ‘open’ style of management: often a simple explanation would satisfy the frustrated officer and allay the doubts of the anxious one.

It also recommends that the service should recruit outside professionals for B branch and send staff to the respected Civil Service College. So far so good. But it misses the main point.

An intelligence officer will not want to talk to even the most efficient and well trained personnel officer unless he knows he has some form of protection, some independent body to fill the role played in the outside world by a trade union.

Backbench MPs have raised the possibility of an independent ombudsman for the service. Unfortunately, the commission never comes to grips with the idea. The commission goes on to make the disastrous recommendation that officers should report on each other’s social behaviour, particularly drinking habits. To impose such a policy from above without consultation would be typical of the service’s bad management.

It would also remove the last refuge of relaxation by making colleagues – as well as outsiders – impossible to trust. If the service learned to manage its staff effectively, such a repellent policy would not be necessary.