Police State 3 – domestic targets of MI5 operations

The Guardian, 19 April 1984

1 Bending the guidelines to target UK activists

The Special Branch and the Security Service now gather more information about more people in Britain than at any time in their history. Put bluntly, this is because they are deliberately flouting the few guidelines that once restricted their activity.

Their official task, enshrined in confidential directives, is to monitor the activities of subversives, defined in Parliament as “activities which threaten the safety or well-being of the state and which are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.”

Historically, this has meant terrorists – mainly anarchists and Irish – and Communists as well as other high-profile groups, especially if they were thought to have any connection with with foreign powers. But now the target is very much larger.

Even a classic target like the Communist Party of Great Britain has grey areas so that surveillance now covers not only politically active Party members but also subscribers to the Morning Star newspaper, donors to CPGB funds and other ‘passive supporters.’

There is, however, a far larger grey area of targets which do not fit the official definition of subversion but which have been smuggled in under a cloak of bogus justification. Many organisations which cannot be classed as subversive are nevertheless watched because some leading member does fit the definition.

The National Union of Mineworkers is not officially a legitimate target. But its entire Scottish section is roped into the grey area by targetting its President, Mick McGahey, who is a member of the Communist Party and, therefore, fair game according to the guidelines. Watching him is the same in practice as watching the Scottish NUM.

Similarly, the House of Commons has been assured by successive Prime Ministers since 1964 that no MP will have his phone tapped. One simple way round this assurance has been to tap the phones of the people to whom a targetted MP speaks regularly.

There is also evidence that senior Whitehall figures are interpreting this assurance to mean that an MP should not be tapped for the purpose of gaining political information. “If I thought an MP was involved in criminal activity or some serious risk, I don’t think the assurance would mean very much,” said one. (It seems unlikely that the Provisional Sinn Fein MP, Gerry Adams, does not have his phone calls targetted.)

As the guidelines have been stretched, so the targets have proliferated, and so the number of Special Branch officers on the ground – particularly in the provinces – has climbed. This produces its own expansion: without any clear directives or supervision from the top, the local SB officer protects his own position by watching as many different groups as possible in case a superior suddenly asks him for information about one of them.

Confronted with this proliferation, some Whitehall sources concede that soft targets are monitored, but argue that they are still only interested in genuine subversives. “The trouble,” said one, ” is that you don’t know whether a thing is worth looking at until you have looked at it, and then you don’t know whether it’s going to change in the future, so you have to carry on looking at it.”

The largest single target for F Branch, who run MI5’s domestic surveillance, remains the Communist Party of Great Britain, even though its membership has slipped to only 15,000 and it has renounced revolution as a means of winning power. F Branch aims to have a personal file on every Party member and sympathiser.

In 1975, builders at CPGB headquarters found a microphone, some eight inches long, secreted in a hollow slot in a rostrum. In 1982, the author Nigel West disclosed that a CPGB official, Betty Reid, had employed an MI5 agent, Betty Gordon, as her housekeeper. Party officials now say they assume they are still thoroughly monitored.

In the last ten years, as the Security Commission noted publicly in 1982, more attention has been paid to other left-wing groups, with the Socialist Workers Party and the Workers Revolutionary Party being particularly heavily infiltrated and watched. This, in turn, has taken the Security Service into the officially legitimate area of members of the Labour Party.

On the right, Special Branch have used informers to penetrate the National Front around the country and have routinely sat in on their public meetings. In the early 70s, officers co-operated with the Front, liaising on the routes of marches to avoid left-wing demonstrations, but this relationship crumbled when the Home Secretary started to use the SB information to ban the Front’s marches.

Since then, the Front has banned its members from dealing with the Branch. Earlier this year, a North London member spent a drunken evening with two officers who debriefed him on the latest power struggle which had led to the removal of Martin Webster as the Front’s activities organiser. The member has been suspended for a year as a punishment.

Robert Edwardes, who was gaoled in 1982 for inciting race hatred, told us he was asked to inform on the right-wing League of St George. “I had been arrested for carrying an offensive weapon, and this bloke came to see me in the cell and started telling me I could trust him and if I had any information I could give it to him. And he said ‘If you cross me I’ll get my boys to break your legs.’ So I said Yeah, I’d co-operate. But I never did. He gave me a number to ring, but I never got in touch with him.”

But spreading away from these classic Communist and Fascist targets, the Special Branch has monitored the Hunt Saboteurs, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Woodcraft Folk (the Children’s Movement linked to the Co-op movement), an entire class who were studying Marxism and Literature at Gwent College of Further Education, and the organisers of a ball at Keele University where Princess Margaret was expected as a guest.

One senior provincial policeman who had run the local Special Branch for several years described succinctly his own strikingly conservative definition of subversion. “I’m an old fashioned nineteenth century moralist,” he said. “I believe certain rules are immutable and cannot be touched. My job is to protect them.”

2 Watching the unions – F2 section

The Security Service and the Special Branches are officially constrained by their guidelines from monitoring legitimate trade union activity. But the evidence suggests that such surveillance is widespread and that the rules are routinely bent to keep the files up to date.

MI5’s F2 section – an important sub-division of the counter-subversion branch – is responsible for watching trade unions. During important strikes F2 works closely with the Civil Contingencies Unit in the Cabinet Office and is required to offer guidance to ministers on questions like the motive behind an industrial action and the attitude of one union to another. But even when there is no major industrial disputes, its surveillance task is permanent and ongoing

Harold Wilson provided a rare insight into this sort of monitoring during the 1966 seamens’ strike when he told the House of Commons that union policy was being manipulated by a “tightly knit group of politically-minded men”.

Two years later, a junior minister was given files – marked for the Security Service – on the country’s two most powerful union leaders, Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon. Much of the material was irrelevant trivia, such as details of trips to Eastern Europe and attendances at meetings where Communists were present. Barbara Castle saw the same files.

Although 99 per cent of trade union activity cannot be honestly classed as subversive, MI5 practice is that the identification of a union member or official as a militant is sufficient to justify surveillance and investigation.

Two weeks ago the Home Secretary, Mr Leon Brittan, said it was a smear to allege that miners’ phones were being tapped in the present strike action against pit closures. But there is ample evidence of such monitoring during major industrial disputes:

* An official for a small union moved to London and was told by a Post Office engineer that his rooms had been bugged the previous week. “We often do it to villains,” the engineer said, ” but I thought by the look of your bookshelves you were just an ordinary trade unionist.”

* David Norman and his colleagues in the Post Office Engineering Union – whose members handle the tapping of phones – used prearranged codes during a go-slow two years ago.

* “It must be more than co-incidence when the phone behaves peculiarly during these periods,” says a Civil Service Union leader. A Fleet Street journalist makes the same point.

Special Branches throughout the country are routinely informed of all known industrial meetings and demonstrations. They also respond to MI5 requests for information on trade unionists and will not hesitate to ask management for information about an employee. Take two cases.

The Security Service file in Curzon Street, Mayfair, on the official of a white collar union in East Anglia contains details of his participation in a factory occupation; statements he has signed; and an account, supplied by an unknown informer, of a private conversation in a hotel bar during a union conference.

An SB report on TGWU shop steward James Hogg (Personal File 886214 in MI5’s registry) admitted that his connection with the Socialist Workers Party was based “solely on hearsay information… from inside the factory.” The report was prepared by a Dumfries and Galloway Special Branch officer in response to a request from F1c, a subsection of the desk in MI5’s counter-subversion branch dealing with the Communist Party.

Trade unions, naturally enough, are becoming increasingly concerned by the extent of Security Service and Special Branch monitoring of their activities, which is clearly not confined solely to big strikes or periods when a state of emergency is declared.

Nalgo, the local government officer’s union, has compiled an extensive dossier on government surveillance of unions and will be calling for an inquiry into the Special Branch and aspects of MI5 work at its annual conference this summer.

Whitehall sources say that the use of agents among both local and union officials is widespread, even in unions which are not known for their militancy, and that such infiltrators are used not only to supply information but also to influence events.

Mr David East, the Chief Constable of South Wales, denied a fortnight ago that his force was conducting phone-tapping against NUM members after a local bus operator said he had been contacted by police from Derbyshire after making arrangements by phone with a union official to transport pickets to Derbyshire. “Perhaps” Mr East said, “the Derbyshire police have got a mole in the NUM.”

Militant trade unionists involved in secondary picketing away from home often see their local Special Branch men following them to different sites. A Communist Party member arrested during the Grunwick dispute in 1977 was told: “We know who you are. If you don’t come clean and tell us about your friends we’ll have you put away.”

3 Bugging the peace movement

The British peace movement is the target of a nationwide covert police effort, reinforced by the Security Service. Whitehall sources justify this by arguing that although peace activists have a right to their opinion, they may be planning to break the law or to threaten military security.

One senior source had a simplistic analysis of those who support the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: “They fall into two camps,” he said. “There are those who are emotionally committed to it all and actually believe in their muddled way that what they are saying is right. And there are those who are simply tools of the Kremlin.”

According to this view, CND is an internal political problem which does not in itself justify MI5’s attention. But since it may also be the tool of a foreign power, it is a legitimate target. “You have to think about where their funds are coming from,” said one source, “whether there’s any money coming from outside the country, and so you have to look at the CND Council and the people involved in the administration.”

The surveillance extends from the top to the bottom of the movement. It is understood that the phone of Msgr Bruce Kent, CND’s general secretary, is tapped. CND’s chair, Joan Ruddock, believes her is tapped – particularly since the Sunday afternoon last year when she discovered that by gently tapping the bar on the top of her phone, she could set off a recording of her last call.

The surveillance appears to involve Special Branch checks on any peace campaigner who comes to police attention. Again, the official view is that although pacifism is not an offence, pacifists may adopt tactics which are an offence and thus they are legitimate targets for surveillance.

At the end of last month, peace groups and others mounted a second Stop The City campaign. Leaked briefing notes, written by Commander Hugh Moore of the City of London police, disclose a pattern of police intelligence gathering. In the notes, Commander Moore gives his view of the campaigners:

“Among the organisations taking part are anarchists, animal liberation, various gay groups, third world activists and women’s groups including Greenham Common. All are anti-establishment, uncooperative with the police and, in the case of some extremists, potentially violent.”

The briefing notes are sprinkled with references to the commander’s ‘intelligence reports’. Special Branch are responsible for gathering much of the basic data about peace activists. There is the now well-known case of Mrs Madeleine Haigh, the West Midlands woman who forced her Chief Constable to admit that she had been investigated simply because she wrote a letter about cruise missiles to her local newspaper.

One Sussex peace worker had a solid week of attention when the Queen was visiting the area. “On Monday evening, a friend called to see me and told me there were four men in a car outside who ducked down as she walked past… On Tuesday, while I was out, some man asked my cleaning lady all about me… On Wednesday, I found a man peering through my back door. When I challenged him, he said he’d got the wrong road, which didn’t really explain why he hadn’t come to the front door…

“On Thursday, as I came out of the front of the house, there was a man in a car who I distinctly saw throw a microphone on the floor. My friend went right up and looked through the window at it… On Friday, while I was out, some uniformed police were seen looking through my windows, but when I rang the station to ask about it, they said they had got the wrong address.

“I can’t think why they would bother with me. I help to run local events and write to newspapers and so on. I prefer to think it is all my paranoia: if I took it seriously, I’d be frightened.”

4 Journalists and the press as targets

There was an outcry earlier this year when Special Branch in London took advantage of a bicycle accident involving the New Statesman journalist Duncan Campbell to seize his private papers and then to search his home.

The incident is by no means isolated: journalists and academic researchers have habitually attracted the attention of Special Branch and MI5 simply by trying to write about them, regardless of whether they actually pose “a threat to parliamentary democracy.”

At its mildest, they have had their manuscripts vetted. An MI5 officer made persistent efforts to persuade the publishers of Andrew Boyle’s Climate of Treason to hand over an advance copy. The Attorney General brought a court action against Nigel West over his history of MI5 using a manuscript which was obtained by mysterious means.

At its more severe, writers have felt intimidated and harassed:

* In 1978, Phil Cohen, a research officer at the Institute of Education, published a paper on Policing the Working Class City. Over the next few months, he received two threatening phone calls from men claiming to be policemen, had a break-in when papers were disturbed but nothing was taken, and was visited by two inquisitive ‘GPO investigators’ about whom the GPO knew nothing.

* In 1977, Steve Wright, a postgraduate student at Lancaster University, was researching a thesis on The Social and Political Implications of New Police Technology. He was particularly interested in phone-tapping. He was raided by six Special Branch officers from Preston who searched his home and his university rooms before taking him into custody for a day and seizing bundles of his books and papers. Some of the papers were never returned, and he was unable to complete the thesis.

*In 1982, James Rusbridger, a retired businessman who once worked for MI6, was helping to research a book on emergency power supplies. Two men came to his home and told him they were BBC engineers who had heard he was interested in emergency power for TV transmitters and thought they might be able to help him. “They started asking me a lot of questions about myself, my life, my income, friends and why I needed this sort of information,” he said. He accused them of being Special Branch, and they refused to confirm or deny the suggestion.

*In 1979, Guy Smith asked Thames Valley police for help with his research project into emergency planning. Soon afterwards, a policeman visited his home to take his personal details because his motorcycle had been seen near the scene of a wages snatch. Mr Smith did not believe this and complained forcefully to police HQ. An assistant chief constable conceded that the officer had been from Special Branch. Although the assistant chief constable apologised for the duplicity, he explained that emergency planning was a sensitive subject: “I think it right that police should satisfy themselves of the authenticity and intentions of persons making such inquiries.”

5 Spying on lawyers

The confidential relationship between lawyers and their clients holds no fears for the Special Branch and the Security Service, and lawyers who represent politically sensitive clients have often found themselves the targets of surveillance.

Alastair Logan, a Guildford solicitor who has acted in a series of Irish bombing trials, is quite sure that his office has been burgled by them. “I can’t prove anything,” he said, “but I’m as near to certain as I can be that this office was entered during the night on more than one occasion while I was acting for Irish people.

“I’ve come in the morning and found things, papers are just not in the same place as they were when I left the night before. What am I going to do about it? Go to the police? I assume they’re responsible or involved in some way. Anyway, I can’t prove a thing.”

A London solicitor who has acted in a number of sensitive cases has had an important file of evidence involving Nato plans spirited out of the office and, on another occasion, suffered a very obvious break-in during which the burglar fell from the roof through the ceiling, spent a considerable time going through files and papers, and left without touching £50 in foreign currency lying in an unlocked desk, the only cash on the premises.

In 1978, the Security Service tried to obtain a Home Office warrant to tap the phone of Lord Gifford, the prominent barrister. The service claimed that he was associating with terrorists: Lord Gifford had acted for Astrid Proll, the German woman wanted for Baader Meinhof activities, and was a member of the International Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners.

The Home Office, for once, rejected the application since Lord Gifford not only fell far short of being “a major subversive, terrorist or espionage” threat, but was also a peer. Undaunted, the Security Service recruited another barrister as an agent to spy on Lord Gifford and to report on the plans of the Astrid Proll defence campaign.

Another barrister with a history of radical causes was standing in a pub when somebody stole his briefcase full of legal papers. He succeeded, through the police, in getting the case back a few days later and found that some of his papers were missing: however, there were photocopies of them in the case instead.