The decision by Michael Bettaney to pass information to the Russians came after a long process of self-examination which marks him out as a most unusual spy.
His motive had nothing to do with greed or blackmail or any of the other traditionally grubby motives for espionage. In his own mind, he was using his position in MI5 to try to stop Great Britain and the Western Alliance tottering into a new world war.
He decided that Washington and London were working together to destabilise the Soviet Union so that it would be destroyed either economically or militarily, and came to the conclusion that he could help to restore some equilibrium by stopping the Security Service from playing its part.
His aim, which apparently misfired from the outset, was to pass so much information about MI5’s operation against the KGB that it would be neutralised as a force. He persuaded himself that he could do this without threatening the security of the country.
By the time he made this decision in the summer of 1982, he had undergone a complete intellectual transformation. When he was recruited into MI5 in 1975, he was a thoroughly conventional, patriotic Oxford graduate who had been brought up a Roman Catholic and whose interests were bound up with classical music and Shakespeare.
In his eight years in the service, he became a Marxist intellectual, the sort of bookish left-wing academic who would fit comfortably into the politics department of any British university. His conversion seems to have been largely inspired by the experience of seeing British policy from the privileged vantage point of MI5.
Soon after his initial vetting and training, he went to Northern Ireland where he spent nearly three years at the sharp end of the British role, seeing the province from a point of view which is inaccessible to most people: unfogged by ignorance and unvarnished by the media.
The experience set off an intellectual and emotional earthquake in him and he began to have serious doubts about the British role in Northern Ireland. However, he seems to have believed that MI5’s role in gathering intelligence on terrorists was not in itself objectionable.
Towards the end of his time in Northern Ireland, two other events accelerated his new mood of disenchantment.
Under the strain of his work he began to drink more heavily and was carpeted and sternly reprimanded by his superiors in the service for getting drunk at a wild party. He was returned to London to work in the training department, a much less glamorous and important job. Since he felt he had worked hard in Northern Ireland and stayed for longer than the normal 18-month tour to help the service, he began to feel mistreated and slightly cynical about his superiors.
At the same time, his mother died at her home in Stoke on Trent. He was upset but, as one person close to him said: “Her death was probably one of the things which freed him from his past and made him more open to new ideas.” He had remained a devout Roman Catholic and now, with his mother’s death, he began to sort out the competing claims of Catholicism and Marxism, apparently deciding that they had enough in common to be compatible.
Quietly and without indiscretion, he became more left-wing and more sceptical about British policy and the security service. He joined the Labour Party, although he fell behind with his subscriptions. He once privately told a friend that he supported CND and then hotly denied it when it came up in front of other intelligence officers.
The atmosphere inside MI5 does nothing to reassure someone who is growing cynical about its work. “The atmosphere of the service is right-wing and reactionary in the worst civil service sense,” according to one former member. “It’s like an exclusive club with all the public-school overtones of easy superiority.
“There is the excitement of living in John Le Carre’s world. The whole aura of secrecy stops the ordinary feeling ordinary and this is a great security. It compensates real-life inadequacies and doubts. The decisions and actions that an officer has to take on the private lives of his fellow citizens make him like a judge or even a God.”
Michael Bettaney was not welcomed into the elite, privileged section of the club perhaps because, although he masked his cynicism, some of his senior colleagues sensed his disrespect. “There were some people whom he really disliked and who disliked him. He didn’t like people who were loud and boorish or stupid. He despised them, which was unusual for such an affable man.”
He developed a reputation as an ‘odd cove’ – always polite and beautifully mannered and smartly turned out in pin-stripe suit and collar and tie, living alone in his house in Surrey, slightly awkward socially, but very sharp intellectually. His colleagues gave in to the temptation to call him Smiley.
His new, silent commitment to socialism vied with his disillusion about the service: on the one hand, he wanted to stay with MI5 and use his position to help the progress of international socialism; on the other hand, he found his work futile and depressing.
He told friends that he was thinking of leaving to become a Catholic priest, but just before Christmas of I982, he was given a new job in K Branch which runs counter-espionage – the heart of MI5’s operation against the Russian Intelligence Service. It is the most important branch in the service because it represents a fascinating intellectual battle of wits with relatively little danger and no moral worries about the target: the KGB is fair game.
Bettaney had already developed an interest in Russian culture: old icons, the music and food. He bought himself a Russian-style fur hat for the winter, started to teach himself Russian from books and records but he showed no signs of his political conviction that he and his service were the wrong side of the barricades.
At this point, the years of uncertainty and intellectual change crystallised into a highly dangerous scheme: he would ‘blow’ the whole counter-Soviet operation in Britain in order to help the Soviet Union to withstand the economic and pressure from the Western alliance.
Now, like Prime, Philby, Vassall and the whole list of spies in the British establishment, he seems to have been able to waltz through his office gathering top secret material with very little difficulty.
He was able to take in his camera when he was night officer, photograph sensitive material and walk out again without being discovered for the simple reason that staff leaving the building are never searched: it is considered unnecessary and unBritish.
The movement of sensitive documents within the building is monitored. But Bettaney evaded this problem by committing useful information to memory and typing it out at home. He hid his manuscripts in a cushion on his sofa and in his laundry cupboard.
With his usual attention to detail, he devised a precise and complicated system of secret signals and dead letter boxes so that he could communicate with the KGB in London without drawing any attention to himself. But the plan was fatally flawed.
He delivered his first anonymous letter to his chosen contact, Arkady Gouk, by hand, avoiding the risk of it being intercepted in the post and knowing from his contact with MI5’s counter-espionage operation that no-one was then posted to watch Mr Gouk’s house. It was unsigned, it set up a fool-proof set of instructions for future contact, and should have secured Bettaney’s safety.
However, Mr Gouk was understandably suspicious of the approach. Coming immediately after the expulsion of three of his colleagues from London, he saw the potential for a trap which would culminate in a new package of hard evidence to justify yet more expulsions. He also faced the perennial problem in the intelligence world of telling good information from deliberate disinformation.
Some journalists have been leaked a semi-official version of events, according to which Mr Gook and his superiors in the KGB made up their minds that Bettaney was trying to set himself up as a double agent and then decided to ruin MI5’s plan by passing all of Bettaney letters back to M15. It is a version which makes little sense.
It is highly unlikely, observers say, that the KGB would have come to such a quick decision. It is far more likely that they would have tried to play Bettaney along to give themselves plenty of time to see whether he was a new and important asset. Even if they had decided that he was hostile, it is far more likely that they would have tried to use him to feed disinformation back to MI5.
It seems that in reality the KGB had decided to work with him and that his capture was caused by a conventional breach in security on the Soviet side, possibly in their communications with Moscow, which alerted MI5 to Mr Gouk’s involvement with a possible new source. Since Mr Gouk was a KGB general – an unusually high rank for a foreign posting – the clue was clearly very important.
The Security Commission is likely to be asked to review MI5’s internal security and to look at the failure to locate Bettaney through positive vetting. However, he comes from the sort of solid, conservative background which scores the highest points in the vetters’ view of the world – generations of Stoke potters; an Army major, a London policeman and several small businessmen among his cousins.
The worst that any vetters would be able to find would be the suggestion that he flirted with neo-fascism in Oxford; and the existence of a second cousin among the Greenham women. There would be nothing new in the discovery that the positive vetting system had failed to discover the way a man’s mind worked.