Police State 1 – Anatomy of the UK’s political policing

The Guardian, 17 April 1984

In May 1982 the Prime Minister gave Parliament her view on the role which the Security Service should play in countering the threat of subversion by domestic political groups. In a White Paper on a security commission report, she said:

“The internal threat has altered considerably. It has become more varied and, viewed as a whole, has grown more serious. The threat offered by the Communist Party of Great Britain has probably diminished as a result of the fall in the number of its members and the disillusionment of many of them with Soviet policy since 1968 in invading Czechoslovakia and, more recently, Afghanistan.

“The fall in CPGB membership, however, has been accompanied by the proliferation of new subversive groups of the extreme left and the extreme right (mainly the former) whose aim is to overthrow democratic parliamentary government in this country by violent or other unconstitutional means, not shrinking in the case of the most extreme groups from terrorism to achieve their aims. Membership of individual groups is small but, for the most part, active and conspiratorial.”

Mrs Thatcher’s statement is a public clue to an unseen development which had for some years been taking place in the monitoring of political activity in Britain. To counter this perceived new, proliferating internal threat, a small force of civil servants and police officers have established a nationwide operation which has led them to defy the law and to evade their own rules in order to record the personal and political lives of broad swathes of the population.

At the heart of the operation is the Security Service, MI5, which celebrates its 75th anniversary this year, an extremely secretive organisation whose 2,000 staff work within the conventional Civil Service structure but without any of the normal scrutiny of their activities.

They organise the tapping of phones and the opening of mail; the infiltration of political groups; and the procurement of informers. They have a section whose main purpose is to break and enter private homes and offices, and they have gained access to confidential personal information held in supposedly private government files.

The arms and legs of the operation are provided by the Special Branch which now has some 1,800 officers spread through every police force in the country. Working apart from ordinary officers, their main role is to investigate ‘subversion’, helping MI5 with local sources of information and their extra police powers of arrest and search.

The Security Service and the Special Branch are linked at the top through the Home Office and in the provinces by a network of nine regions in which MI5 representatives direct the Special Branches towards new priorities and handle particularly sensitive case work.

Although the foundations of this operation have existed since before the First World War, its character and size have changed: new soft targets such as peace activists have been added to the old ones like spies and terrorists; new techniques of surveillance have invaded privacy and infringed civil rights.

The concern of Downing Street and the Cabinet Office about its work has grown. The morale of some of those involved has started to fall: although the leadership appears to be solidly committed to its work, there are now some people who are warning that in the long term it, will suffer from its secrecy, its lack of accountability and its disrespect for the law.

Those concerned with the present state of the Security Service take differing views of these changes. According to one, the service is “cynically manipulating the letter and the spirit of its charter. The clear-cut definitions have been eroded, and so a grey area has spread. There is now a dangerous and maybe irreversible slide; the momentum in that direction has perceptibly increased since 1979.”

Another recognised the change, but defended it. “The change that has been required, which has been very, very significant for both the overt and the covert security forces, has meant that they are more and more intrusive. Some civil liberties do go by the board. When people are under suspicion then their privacy is intruded upon. I regret that this has happened, but I don’t apologise for it because it’s the only way that we can possibly begin to meet the threat.

“I regret that it is now necessary to spy on people to the extent that we do. I regret it is now necessary to vet so many people whereas before you could take their loyalty for granted. I regret that within the organs of Government you now have to he looking at almost everybody whereas before you looked at one per cent. But although I regret it, it is necessary.”

The headquarters of the Security Service is Curzon House, a squat six-floor concrete building in Mayfair.

At the head of the organisation sits the Director General, a remote figure who finds other people rather difficult to deal with and prefers to delegate to his chain-smoking deputy, an incisive man in his late 50s. The deputy is well thought of in the Home Office and will probably take over soon.

Between them, these two men determine the direction of the Security Service and lay down its priorities. They link upwards to the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister and, through their secretariat and staff officers, to the other intelligence services and to their own officers abroad. Beneath them are the six branch directors.

There is A Branch, in charge of field work and, therefore, many of the Service’s dirty tricks. A1 (technical operations) section includes the MI5 officers who burgle properties to photograph documents or plant bugs. They have no legal immunity to do this, but, so far, they have not been caught.

Other parts of A Branch transcribe the tapes of tapped phone calls; run mobile and static surveillance on targets (in a section known as The Watchers); keep safe houses and listening posts; specialise in extracting confidential information from contacts in government departments like the DHSS and the DoE, and from banks and hotels; and liaise with GCHQ to reap the benefit of their electronic eavesdropping.

The man in charge of A Branch is described variously as ‘a character’ and ‘an eccentric’ and infectiously enthusiastic. He is a devoted amateur musician who runs the MI5 choir (cutely known as the Oberon Singers after the king of the underworld).

B Branch is effectively the service’s personnel department. It is responsible for the recruitment and, therefore, the vetting of new staff and for the welfare and personnel management of all employees. It also looks after finance and the personal and physical security of MI5 officers and buildings.

Its director is a shrewd, quiet man, described by one source as ‘gnome-like in every sense.’ He has extended the reach of the service’s recruitment by cultivating contacts in the Careers Advisory Boards of red-brick and plate-glass universities.

C Branch deals with the safety of official buildings and secrets, so it advises the security officers of each government department; inspects their security arrangements; and leads leak inquiries. It also advises private companies who work on classified contracts; and runs the vetting system for Whitehall, the armed forces and the police.

It has a special role in counter-sabotage and counter-terrorism which means that it draws up contingency plans to handle possible incidents – such as the occupation of a nuclear power station – and then runs exercises with the SAS and special police units to learn how to deal with them.

The director of C Branch is a very conservative figure who is little known to his colleagues because he is, by nature, quiet and self-effacing and also because he has spent almost his whole career inside C Branch.

From the point of view of domestic political surveillance, F Branch is the most important part of M15. It is responsible for handling ‘subversion’ and is currently run by a young and ambitious officer who made his name for his handling of the 1972 miners’ strike.

He was then in charge of the sub-section which deals with trade unions and he kept Whitehall briefed with a running analysis of the political motivations of the miners’ leaders, their strategy, immediate tactics, expectations and internal divisions. He went on to run the joint intelligence operation in Northern Ireland.

F Branch is clearly sub-divided: F1 investigates the Communist Party; F2 investigates trade unions; F3 investigates terrorism; F5 investigates Irish terrorism; F7 looks at other left-wing groups as well as right-wing extremists, MPs, teachers, lawyers and journalists. Two of its sections are hived off to a separate sub-branch, known as FX, which is responsible for long-term infiltration of agents. F4 puts agents into political parties and organisations; F6 runs them into trade unions at all levels. The current head of FX was a surprise appointment who does not command the respect of all his colleagues.

While FX runs its agents into ‘subversive’ targets, the rest of F Branch monitors the same targets with all the other means at its disposal including taps, bugs, mail opening, break-ins and local investigations by Special Branch. F Branch’s young director is regarded as a strong contender to become Director General sooner or later.

His main competition comes from the head of K Branch, which looks after counter-espionage – basically, the Russians and their allies. He is also relatively young, in his late 40s, and highly spoken of by colleagues and by the army with whom he has worked in Northern Ireland.

K Branch uses all available techniques to monitor the activity of Russian intelligence officers at the Embassy, the trade delegation and other centres as well as the work of other Soviet bloc intelligence services. It will sometimes use local Special Branch officers to follow Soviet targets who travel outside London.

The sixth branch, S Branch, runs a variety of back-up services, the most important of which is known as JCB, the Joint Computer Bureau, which is linked to MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service. It also runs MI5’s own registry, where dossiers on 500,000 people are held; as well as training and miscellaneous support services such as travel, accommodation and printing. Its director used to be the head of the Northern Ireland operation.

The Northern Ireland crisis has forced many changes in the Security Service, and much of the hardening of attitudes and disrespect for the rules and the law is traceable to this. It has also created the need for a special intelligence operation. This is run as an adjunct to the main MI5 structure by the office of the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence, who works from Stormont Castle in Belfast to link the intelligence effort of the army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, MI5 and MI6.

The Security Service has foreign outposts. It keeps its own people, known as security liaison officers, in Washington, Ottawa, Melbourne, Berlin, Cyprus, Hong Kong and at the British Army of the Rhine, BAOR, headquarters at Rheindahlen, West Germany. It also has a role in the little known British Services Security Organisation where there are British troops on foreign soil; and has direct telex links to European security services.

According to some insiders, the staff of MI5 live a strange and rather lonely life, surveying and monitoring the world outside but isolated from it by the strict security demanded by their work. Like any other government department, these sources say, the staff are a mixed bag. Some middle-ranking officers resent their superiors. There are junior staff who feel hidebound by the custom and practice of years and complain that initiative is discouraged. But unquestionably there is talent.

An academic who wrote an article about arms smuggling was approached by an MI5 officer for information about his sources. Using the cover name ‘Steve’ the officer was, “was very intelligent, a shrewd observer”, as the academic recalls. “He never put pressure on me as such and never offered money. He figured out very quickly what I drink and what food I like.

“I remember him saying, for example: ‘Those are very nice continental cufflinks, 18 carat gold, aren’t they?’ He said things about my accent, my behaviour, and asked very astute questions. If he is a typical operative then I’d say they’ve got a good team.”

MI5 has immense power. In domestic political surveillance, that power rests principally on the freedom to decide who is the internal enemy. They draw the lines and define the criteria and, thus, establish the basis of a wide range of activities: they influence the hiring of employees in the whole public sector and in sensitive parts of the private sector; the progress of new political formations; the conduct of industrial disputes; the access of journalists and academics to official information.

MI5 makes these decisions, always, with the absolute minimum of interference from Parliament and Downing Street. Their independence is preserved by the demands of security which, they say, make it impossible for them to share details of their work. Prime ministers, home secretaries, senior policemen, senior civil servants are all told only what they need to know; and, very often, that is nothing.

The Director General is responsible to the Home Secretary. The two men meet about once a month for a general chat, which very rarely involves the disclosure of any operational detail. There is also a separate infrastructure of intelligence committees around the Cabinet Office.

This structure has got much stronger since the Blunt affair of 1979. The key figure now is the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, who sits on all the intelligence committees and represents the needs and views of the Prime Minister. Sir Anthony Duff, who is the Cabinet’s Intelligence Coordinator, prepares regular briefing papers for Mrs Thatcher.

But this Cabinet Office structure has no more operational control over the Security Service than the Home Secretary does. Its main purpose is to process the intelligence gathered about foreign powers by MI6 and GCHQ. MI5 is a customer, in that it will receive useful information through its representatives on the committees.

The Director General’s links with Downing Street remain ad hoc. He is likely to meet Sir Robert Armstrong several times a week at meetings of intelligence committees and he may ask for direct access to the Prime Minister if he wants it.

The Prime Minister and Sir Robert have two levers which may be used in extremis: they appoint and can dismiss the Director General; and they can scrutinise his budget through the Official Committee on Security, which Sir Robert chairs. The Prime Minister has recently brought pressure on the Director General to keep her informed about security lapses in MI5, but there is no sign that she has persuaded him to disclose more about the service’s operational activity.

When it comes to the selection of targets and the means of dealing with them, there is little friction between the Security Service and the current Prime Minister and her intelligence committees.

The leading figures share a common point of view and often a common past, particularly through their role in counter-terrorism. Sir Robert Armstrong used to be the Home Office Deputy Secretary responsible for security liaison, terrorism and subversion, before rising to become Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office, responsible for signing phone-tap and mail interception warrants against terrorists and other domestic targets. The experience of dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland is a particularly common background. The current Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office is Sir Brian Cubbon who has served in Northern Ireland, as did Sir Brookes Richards, the last Cabinet Intelligence Co-ordinator; and Sir Howard Smith, the last Director General of MI5; as well as two recent Home Secretaries, Merlyn Rees and William Whitelaw; and the present Commissioner of Scotland Yard, Sir Kenneth Newman. It is a tight circle.

Much of the ground work for MI5 is done by the police Special Branch, which over the years has become virtually an extension of the Security Service. The relationship is not always an easy one, the Oxbridge background of M15 against the more down-to-earth style of the Special Branch.

The Special Branch’s biggest single area of operation – and the reason for its creation in 1883 – is Irish Republican terrorism on the mainland. In this one area, it has precedence over MI5 and works as a national force, running its own informers, taking its own investigative initiatives and making arrests. MI5 would rather be in charge and has succeeded in getting control of the monitoring of Loyalist activity on the mainland.

Regular police anti-terrorist officers have little affection for their colleagues in the Special Branch and often complain that the Branch does not share the intelligence which it collects and also has no concept of gathering admissible evidence to run a prosecution.

In other areas – spies, terrorists apart from IRA and INLA, the left, the right, trade unions – Special Branch is the willing servant of the Security Service, with which it has far closer connections than generally has been realised.

At the top, F4 division of the Police Department of the Home Office makes policy on counter-subversion in consultation with senior officers of MI5 and key police officers – the head of the London Special Branch, the Scotland Yard Commissioner, and the leaders of ACPO, the Association of Chief Police Officers. But this policy is limited.

For practical and political reasons, the Home Office has never given Special Branches a list of those political groups or trade unionists whom it considers are worthy targets. Instead, in 1977, it provided general guidelines and left it to the individual Special Branch officer to decide which threats he should counter.

However, this policy vacuum is filled by MI5. In each of its nine regions, MI5 has an intelligence officer and a police liaison officer, usually a retired senior policeman who has been taken on to MI5’s payroll. Their job is to influence the local chief constable and the local Special Branch officers to secure their help in ways useful to MI5.

One senior police officer told us: “The liaison man will pop in to see the chief constable and have a cup of tea, talk about things. He’ll say ‘They’re a bit worried up in London about so-and-so.’ And the chief constable will talk about what should be done about keeping a better eye on so-and-so and generally, reassure him.”

MI5 deals directly with Special Branch officers, who often attend seminars or training sessions to bring them up to date on targets and techniques. New technical aids are introduced by the scientists of MI5 and MI6 working together and then passed on to the branch.

On specific investigations, MI5 will bring in Special Branch officers to make local inquiries or to carry out a time-consuming surveillance, to open a file for them or to help them to conduct a burglary.

Special Branch leaders are just as resistant to political control, and local police authority members who have tried to discover information about them have generally been rebuffed. Some chief constables even find they cannot discover what their branch officers are doing. “They only tell me what I need to know,” said one, “and that’s not much.”

MI5’s upper hand is reflected in the relationship between officers of the two organisations. Special Branch officers try to nurture MI5 officers as valuable contacts and speak of them with some awe. MI5 and the rest of the intelligence community, however, make little effort to hide their lack of respect for Special Branch officers, particularly those in the provinces.

The folklore of Britain’s internal security apparatus is replete with tales of Special Branch bungling and ineptitude – the over-keen officer who is not happy just to tail a target but has to break into his car as well; the cunning, covert approach to a suspect which immediately raises suspicions and gives the game away; the targetting of obviously harmless people.

This may reflect the recent growth of the branches and, as some suggest, recruiting of less able officers. In the late 1960s, there were some 300 Special Branch officers in London and less than 50 others, concentrated in large airports and docks, around the country. Now there are estimated to be more than 400 in London, a further 850 in the rest of the country, another 100 in Scotland, and some 400 in Northern Ireland.

In addition, Special Branch’s growth is reflected in a series of now independent police off-shoots: the Illegal Immigrants Intelligence Unit, the Drugs Intelligence Unit, the Diplomatic Protection Group, the Anti-Terrorist Squad, and the D11 firearms squad have all been separated as off-shoots from the Branch so that it can concentrate on its core functions; and they continue to work closely and to swap personnel.

In addition to its direct work with MI5 and with Irish Republican terrorism, Special Branch is heavily involved in VIP protection, watching ports and airports, registering aliens, vetting naturalisation applicants and enforcing the Official Secrets Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and election law. Two years ago it was given a special responsibility for investigating racial attacks.

The Metropolitan Police Special Branch remains the most important in the country. Its head, Colin Hewett, has the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissioner, more senior than the head of any other specialist squad. It has two commanders—one for administration and another, Peter Phelan, who used to be in the Anti-Terrorist Squad, for operations.

Beneath them are eight Detective Chief Superintendents organising its various roles with the 24-hour watch on Heathrow Airport and the demands of VIP protection absorbing most man hours. London officers tend to stay with Special Branch for most of their careers moving from desk to desk within it. All SB officers must be positively vetted.

Counter terrorism is a major priority. After the Irish threat, the Middle East provides most work. A section of 12 officers keeps permanent watch on Iranians, Libyans, Palestinians and others and relies heavily on contacts with MI5 and the embassies of target countries and political exiles living in the UK.

Subversion is nevertheless an important preoccupation. Half a dozen officers spend so much time following the National Front that their names and faces are well-known. On the left, they or their informers are involved in the same groups as MI5, working with the Security Service to build up the picture.

Like MI5 they target trade unionists, particularly national officials in London, and peace activists and defend their behaviour by saying that even if these targets are not genuine subversives, they are likely to commit public order offences, which is another of the branch’s special responsibilities.

But secret bureaucracies have innate dangers. They can go off the rails – like the Special Branch in South Australia, which was formed along the lines of the British force with advice from the former MI5 Director General, Sir Percy Sillitoe. In 1977, Judge J. M. White conducted a thorough inquiry and found it had run completely out of control. He found that the Special Branch had deliberately lied to politicians to conceal the existence of thousands of dossiers containing information on members of the Australian Labour Party, any university academic who could be classified as left-wing, vicars, trade unionists, civil libertarians and judges and magistrates.

The dossiers had been compiled, the judge concluded, “on the unreasoned assumption that any persons who thought or acted less conservatively than suited the security force were likely to be potential dangers to the security of the state.” Many of them, he added, were hopelessly inaccurate and laden down with irrelevant information. As a result, the South Australian Special Branch was disbanded.