The shooting of Steven Waldorf was not the freak event that it seemed at first to be. It was rather the most brutal and obvious example of a well-established but little recognised trend for officers of the Crown to pick up guns and misfire them.
The jury’s decision to acquit Detective Constable Peter Finch and Detective Constable John Jardine of attempting to murder Mr Waldorf underlines the fact a tragedy can occur without any malice. There is a real margin for error in the police use of firearms which means that mistakes are an inherent and inevitable result.
The Police Federation, which represents most of the gun-carrying officers in England and Wales, acknowledges this. According to a senior member of the federation: “The frightening thing about Waldorf is that it has been coming for years, and there will undoubtedly be more Waldorfs.”
Right at the heart of the problem lies the fact that a policeman with a gun may have to make an absolute decision – about the life or death of his opponent – without having absolutely clear evidence about how to make it.
Peter Finch saw a man he believed was David Martin. He was wrong but he did not know that at the time. He saw the man make a sudden movement as if to grab a gun. He was wrong again, but within a moment he was acting on that wrong perception, crouching with his arms extended, firing.
The important point – from an armed policeman’s angle – is that if it had been David Martin and if he had been reaching for a gun, he would have looked no different from Steven Waldorf reaching for his briefcase, and if, in that split second, Peter Finch had decided that there was no danger, he would himself have been shot.
The fact that it was Steven Waldorf, an innocent film editor and not David Martin, only made more obvious the sort of operational error which has bedevilled the use of firearms by police. The error can take many different forms.
Almost exactly 10 years before the Waldorf incident, on February 20 1973, PC Stanley Conley, an armed member of the Special Patrol Group, was called to the Indian High Commission near the Strand. He was told armed men were in the building. Later he described his encounter with one of them: “He was holding a gun, and I could tell by the look in his eyes that he was going to fire. I thought I was going to be shot at. I reacted. It was him or me. As soon as I saw his gun, I fired immediately.”
It transpired that the 19-year-old youth who PC Coney killed was carrying a harmless plastic pistol, sold in Woolworths for 55 pence. The other youth who was shot through the head at the same time by PC George Burrows was also brandishing a toy gun.
In the same way, Albert Atkins, aged 32, was shot in the stomach by PC Robert Finney in 1980 after using a toy gun to kidnap two police officers. In August of that year, Steven Dean, aged 22, was critically injured by police bullets while he was using a replica gun to rob a hotel in Norwood, south London.
With hindsight it is clear that these people were wrongly shot, but at the time, for the officer staring into the barrel of the gun, the issue was nothing like as clear. Even if the policeman’s target is armed with a real gun, there is room for error.
David Gill, who is now serving a seven-year sentence for possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life, claims that he was wrongly shot when he was arrested in September 1980. He admits that he had a shotgun.
“I came to a road block and was ordered out of the car by an armed police inspector. I decided not to stop and was fired at three times. One bullet hit me on the side of the head above the left ear and the other two missed me by inches.” Gill claims that, at the time, he had a fractured wrist and was using his one healthy hand to drive. His shotgun, he says, was lying on the car seat untouched.
The officer who shot him said afterwards that he thought Gill had threatened him. Gill insists he did nothing worse than to drive through the road block. The point is that they could both be right, and it is just not clear whether the officer should or should not have fired.
Even with totally unarmed targets, disputes arise. Leroy Fullerton, now serving a long prison sentence, ran to his car to escape police in July 1981 and was shot as he was about to drive off. The officer said he thought Fullerton was armed. Fullerton says he did nothing worse than to try to drive away.
In all of these cases – replica guns, real guns, no guns – there are no hard rules to cover the critical moment when armed officer faces armed criminal: there cannot be, because each situation is different. And this is reflected in vagueness and confusion in the law, the procedures, guidelines and training.
There is effectively no law that specifically covers the behaviour of armed policemen. There is only section three of the Criminal Law Act 1967 which deals with the behaviour of any citizen who is trying to uphold the law. It says: “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in the effecting of or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.”
The key phrase – which echoed through the trial of DCs Finch and Jardine – is ‘reasonable force in the circumstances’. What does it mean? In theory, the phrase has to be defined anew after each incident by a jury which examines the facts. In practice, the meaning of the phrase has been defined not by a jury after a public hearing but by the Director of Public Prosecutions.
In the last ten years, armed police have killed Basharat Hussain, Mohammed Hanif Hussain, Robert Hart, Michael Calvey, Barry Prudon, Gail Kinchin, Paul Howe and Tony Barbour. On the advice of the DPP, none of the officers involved has faced criminal proceedings.
In the Waldorf case, DC John Dean, who fired five shots in the incident, remained uncharged on the grounds that he had genuinely believed that David Martin was firing on his colleagues. The decision to prosecute DCs Finch and Jardine caused anger and dismay among many officers who carry guns, who say they feel exposed and unsure of how they are supposed to use their weapons.
In March, in an attempt to calm public concern and clarify the vagueness of the law, the Home Office issued police forces round the country with new guidelines on the use of firearms. They specify that “firearms are to be used by authorised and trained officers only as a last resort where conventional methods have been tried and failed or must from the nature of the circumstances obtaining be unlikely to succeed if tried.”
A lot of officers are not very impressed with that advice. Where does it leave them, they ask, when there are replica guns or sudden movements in the dark or people taking hostages with knives or any of the other myriad forms of violence which require a split-second judgment?
The guidelines say that officers must produce their pink ‘authorisation’ card which shows they have been trained in the use of guns before being issued with a weapon and they specify the procedure for keeping records on the use of guns.
They add that “unless it is considered impracticable, an oral warning is to be given before the firearm is used.” The officers are still not very impressed, and one angry police source said: “The guidelines might as well have been signed by Pontius Pilate as Willy Whitelaw for all the good they do us.”
Probably the most significant paragraph in the guidelines comes at the end: “The responsibility for the use of the firearm is an individual decision which may have to be justified in legal proceedings. Remember the law. Remember your training.“
But the training, like the guidelines and the law, comes back to vagueness. “There are no absolutes in tactics,” as one senior officer said. “You can’t lay it down rigidly in black and white for the simple reason that you can’t tell in advance what situation that officer is going to encounter.”
At the Scotland Yard training course in Lippits Hill, north London, they try to key up the tactical sense and awareness of officers by playing them videos of encounters with criminals, filmed from the point of view of an officer.
They take one particular scene and film it half a dozen times, each time varying the ending, changing the degree of danger. The trainee officers have to spot the moment when they would draw their weapon and when they would fire; and then watch the rest of the film to see whether they were justified.
At the end of the five-day course, officers are assessed on their marksmanship and tactical understanding. Some 15 per cent fail. The rest go on to become authorised officers, carrying their pink card.
London officers are passing through the Lippits Hill course at the rate of 20 a week. In the Metropolitan area now, 4,776 of the force’s 25,000 men are ‘authorised shots’, according to Scotland Yard. By comparison, five years ago there were only 3,488.
The Yard is at pains to point out that that does not mean that there are 4,776 armed officers on the streets of London each day. Many of those qualified officers will never draw a gun for a real operation in their career.
The Yard is, however, less forthcoming with the figures of just how many police guns are on the street each day. The Diplomatic and Royal Protection Group, elements of the Special Branch and other escort groups are routinely armed. Others like the Robbery Squad and the Anti-Terrorist Squad may be armed more often than not. Apart from these groups who are frequently armed, Yard figures show that the number of occasions on which weapons are issued for specific operations has risen from about 1,000 in 1970 to about 7,000 in 1980.
The reason for this rise in the training and use of firearms is a matter of bitter dispute. The police link it directly with the abolition of the death penalty and a supposed willingness by criminals since then to kill policemen. The figures on the deaths of policemen on duty do not bear out that theory, and the general assumption that armed criminals have produced armed policemen is challenged by the much-quoted thesis of an experienced Scotland Yard officer, Chief Supt Mike Hoare.
Hoare concluded his study of the police use of firearms in London in the seventies by noting that the capital’s officers alone accounted for 76 per cent of the guns drawn by policemen over the whole country. “This rise does not coincide in any way with known armed crime,” he said.
The position now is that, particularly in London, more and more police carry firearms on operations in a manner which is riddled with practical dangers and confused by legal and procedural vagueness. This development has occurred without real public debate as to the justification and without real public scrutiny of those occasions when the guns have been used.
As police officers readily agree in private, the lessons of the Waldorf incident have to be learned and acted on, or there will be a repeat.