Angola fights the chaos left behind by Portuguese colonialists

The Guardian, 14 September 1981

In Angola, 1981 is the Year of Discipline and Control. The message is thrust down to the people from posters on the street hoardings. Public notices end with the exhortation: “Disciplina, disciplina, disciplina.” It is all very necessary.

The streets of Luanda are littered with the results of the lack of discipline and control exhibited by the capital’s drivers. Most of the lamp posts have been smashed to the ground, and the walls of houses are bruised and sagging from countless collisions.

It is not that the Angolans are particularly insane drivers. They have just never learned to drive. In November 1975, when the Portuguese colonialists finally left, the new government realised that very few of its own people could handle a car. What could they do?

Either they made people take driving lessons and pass proper driving tests, in which case the economy would grind to a halt; or they turned a blind eye, crossed their fingers, and hoped for the best.

They say in Luanda that motorists have sorted themselves out in truly Darwinian fashion: the worst ones are dead and the better have survived. Unfortunately, the bad ones took hundreds of vehicles, including ambulances and more than 150 new Yugoslavian buses, with them.

Only this year, six years after independence, is the public transport system in Luanda beginning to function efficiently. It is now one small victory in Angola’s desperate battle to recover from the Portuguese exodus.

The 500,000 Portuguese left a great many good things behind them: beautiful old colonial buildings, hospitals, modern factories and roads. But by removing the entire civil service, the educational system, the skills of almost every industry, most of the commercial network, and their money, they rendered them useless.

Like the salt cellars in the Tropico Hotel, in the centre of Luanda: finely fashioned Portuguese glass shakers with perforated silver caps. They are filled with local sea salt crystals which are too big to shake through the perforations. Beautiful but useless.

The whole bureaucracy has the same air of ornamental aimlessness. Angolans fill in forms and store carbon copies to cover every occasion. One Westerner in Luanda said: “They do it because the Portuguese did it, but nothing happened to the forms once they were filled in. I’m afraid a lot of them do not even understand what the forms say.”

The Portuguese have left their mark on industry. At the N’Gola beer factory, outside Lubango, most of the equipment is South African: it was bought and installed before independence. Now the Angolans have to scour the rest of the world to find spare parts without dealing with Pretoria.

Down the road the provincial furniture factory, struggling to recover from a South African bombing raid in 1979, is still producing ornate pseudo-Welsh dressers for colonial families who no longer exist. It is what they have been trained to do, and they continue to do it even though there is a crying need for simple household furniture.

Without the Portuguese who built them, the docks of Luanda are clogged with vessels waiting up to six months to be unloaded. The delays cost the government an estimated £4,000 per vessel a day in demurrage charges – about £2 million a week.

The Angolans’ struggle to pull themselves out of the post-colonial swamp is made harder by the war they are fighting on two fronts – with the South African military in the south and with the South African-backed Unita guerrillas in the central highlands.

Agricultural production has slumped. Before independence, Angola was a net exporter of food. Now it spends 70 per cent of its non-military budget on importing food, mostly from Holland, Portugal, and South America.

The appeal for discipline and control is one element in a huge effort to pull the economy together. It is an effort which is, in typically Angolan style, riddled with desperation and paradox.

Angola’s future wealth lies in two commodities which it owns in abundance: oil and diamonds. Those two resources make it potentially one of the richest countries on the continent. But it has been forced to hand over their exploitation to its two worst enemies.

The diamond industry is run by a company called Diamang. It is 77 per cent state-owned. But the rest of its shares are held by Western companies, and by the Diamond Trading Company, which supplies most of the expertise, the market contacts, the leadership, and which is a subsidiary of the Anglo-American De Beers combine, the flagship of the South African economy.

Similarly, the oil industry is run by Sonangol in which the State holds 51 per cent of the shares. The rest of the shares are held by Gulf Oil, which physically runs the industry with the help of a $114 million loan from the United States Exim Bank, and smaller operations run by Belgians, Brazilians, French, and Italians.

The paradox runs both ways. Angola has handed its wealth to its enemies, but its enemies are paying for the country’s defence by earning the foreign exchange which covers the costs of the 18,000 Cuban troops, the Soviet military advisers, the MiGs and the T34 tanks.

The oil and diamond industries are only the most dramatic examples of the way in which Marxist-Leninist Angola refuses to play the part of a Soviet satellite. The practical demands of survival mean that the Angolans will deal with anyone who is straight with them and offers a good deal.

The position is now complicated by the Angolan realisation earlier this year that they were in danger of spending more foreign currency than they were earning through their oil and diamonds.

Rather than embroil themselves with loans on the international money market, they decided temporarily to stop buying foreign goods by refusing all import licences and letters of credit.

While foreign trade treads water, President Dos Santos appealed again last week for Western companies to invest in Angola. “We are ready to increase cooperation which is justly based either with countries in the Socialist world or with those in the Western world,” he said.

Later this month, the Angolan Foreign Minister, Mr Paulo Jorge, is expected to visit a number of West European capitals, including Rome and Bonn, to pave the way for economic deals. He has already visited Brussels. Other ministers have made private visits to London to seek out contacts.

The government is trying to make the economy more attractive by running a national literacy campaign and by tightening up factory discipline by publishing the names of those who are losing pay for absenteeism or other offences at work. The future of the economy is framed in a five-year plan.

They are having some success. The public transport system in Luanda is beginning to work. Flights to Lisbon, Rome, and Paris are taking off regularly. Internal flights are better, although subject to delay.

In the factories there is a thriving rough-house democracy. Party members are chosen at open meetings where candidates are exposed to the praise and criticism of their colleagues. Good and bad work performances are aired in the same way.

Food prices are regulated, and a system of ration cards is intended to give everyone a guarantee of basic supplies.